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SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM BY SAVING
HEALTH REFORM: IMPLICATIONS OF
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
INDEPENDENT BUSINESS V. SEBELIUS
Brietta Clark*
On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court issued one of its most
anticipated decisions in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius (“NFIB”)—the constitutional challenge to the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). The ACA is President
Obama’s signature accomplishment and creates a number of reforms
intended to reduce cost, improve the quality of healthcare and health
outcomes, and expand access to care. The main pillars of the ACA are
the expansions of public and private insurance coverage. These
expansions were the targets of a number of legal challenges by states,
private individuals, and various organizations, with two reaching the
Supreme Court in NFIB. The first, and the one that has received the
most attention, was the challenge to the individual mandate as
exceeding Congress’s commerce and taxing powers. The second was a
challenge to the structure of the Medicaid expansion as coercive in
violation of the Tenth Amendment limit on Congress’s spending power.
These challenges were also significant because if either provision had
been found unconstitutional, it might have been used to invalidate the
entire heath reform law.
The political and legal commentary about the challenges focused
on the mandate as an exercise of the commerce power. Opponents of
reform warned that upholding the mandate would lead to an
unprecedented expansion of federal power in violation of our dual
system of government. They shaped the dominant narrative that
presented federal power as an inherent threat to state sovereignty and
individual liberty. The mandate was seen as the beginning of a parade
of other horrible intrusions into our personal lives, and state opposition
as essential to protecting personal liberty. In this narrative, NFIB
presented the Court with a dichotomous choice: Would the conservative
majority—Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Alito, Scalia,

* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; J.D., University of Southern
California Law School; B.A., University of Chicago. The author would like to thank the Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review editorial staff, and especially Production Editor Nicole Kau and
Editor-in-Chief Scott Klausner, for their incredible work on this Article.
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Thomas, and Kennedy—take this opportunity to further limit federal
power, or could the liberal wing of the Court sway one of the other
Justices (most wrongly predicted Justice Kennedy) to uphold the
mandate? The Court surprised many by answering “yes” to both.
The Court upheld the mandate as a constitutional exercise of the
taxing power and preserved the Medicaid expansion as an option for
states, but Chief Justice Roberts’s approach defied the simplistic
narrative that dominated commentary before the decision. By upholding
the mandate and the ACA, the Court has preserved a powerful new
version of cooperative federalism in healthcare—one that creates a
federal platform for state experimentation, innovation, and regulation
to facilitate meaningful choice in the private health-insurance market.
At the same time, however, Chief Justice Roberts penned certain parts
of the opinion that may advance more traditional federalist aims of
limiting the commerce and spending powers. Most notable was the
Court’s unprecedented finding that the Medicaid expansion was
structured in a coercive way and so could not be required as a
condition of Medicaid participation generally. States now have the
choice to opt in to the expansion or to refuse to participate, creating
uncertainty for the poorest residents in states that opposed reform.
More fundamentally, this holding suggests that the Spending Clause
may now be a more viable site for federalism-based attacks and used to
limit the federal government’s ability to adapt its spending conditions
to changing realities in longstanding healthcare programs like
Medicaid and Medicare.

Winter 2013]

SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM

543

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 545
II. OVERVIEW OF THE ACA AND KEY PROVISIONS SUBJECT TO
CHALLENGE............................................................................ 551
A. Insurance Expansion in the ACA .................................... 552
1. Medicaid Expansion................................................... 552
2. Private Insurance Reforms ......................................... 555
a. Consumer protections ........................................... 557
b. Shared responsibility and the individual
mandate ................................................................ 557
c. Health benefit exchanges and the role of states .... 559
B. Responses and Legal Challenges to Reform .................... 560
1. Claims That Did Not Reach the Supreme Court:
What NFIB Is Not About ........................................... 563
2. Questions Reaching the Supreme Court in NFIB ...... 565
III. THE DOMINANT NARRATIVE IN THE HEALTH REFORM
DEBATE .................................................................................. 567
A. Safeguarding Federalism by Limiting Federal Power ..... 568
1. The Political Narrative ............................................... 568
2. The Legal Narrative ................................................... 570
B. Focus on the Mandate and the Commerce Clause
Debate ............................................................................. 579
1. The Mandate and the Parade of Horribles: An Easy
Target ......................................................................... 579
2. The Medicaid Expansion: A More Formidable
Federalist Foe ............................................................ 580
3. Regulating Commerce Versus the Power to Tax
and Spend .................................................................. 582
IV. UPHOLDING THE MANDATE WITH A TWIST: THE TAXING
POWER SAVES THE DAY ......................................................... 584
A. Why the Mandate Exceeds the Commerce Power: The
Activity–Inactivity Distinction ....................................... 585
1. The Substantial Effects Test ...................................... 588
2. The Necessary and Proper Clause.............................. 590
B. The Mandate as a Constitutional Exercise of the
Taxing Power: The Tax–Penalty Distinction .................. 592

544

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:541

1. Why the Anti-Injunction Act Does Not Apply: The
Payment as a Penalty ................................................. 595
2. The Constitutional Analysis: Reconceptualizing
the Payment as a “Tax” ............................................. 597
V. NFIB’S UNPRECEDENTED FINDING OF COERCION: ALLOWING
STATES TO OPT OUT OF THE MEDICAID EXPANSION .............. 602
A. The Spending Power ........................................................ 603
1. The Dole Test Before NFIB ....................................... 604
2. After NFIB: A New Theory of Coercion or the
Dole Test with Teeth?................................................ 607
a. Nature of the inducement ...................................... 608
b. Amount of the inducement ................................... 610
B. Severability in a Different Light ...................................... 611
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF NFIB ............................................................. 613
A. Broader Constitutional Law Implications ........................ 613
1. From Commerce to Tax and Spend: A Shifting
Battleground for Attacks on Federal Power? ............ 614
2. Chief Justice Roberts’s Legacy and the Role of
Judicial Restraint ....................................................... 616
B. ACA Implementation and the Future of Health Policy ... 619
1. Moving Beyond Rhetorical Federalism ..................... 620
2. Adaptability of Federal Healthcare Programs............ 623
3. Uncertainty Created by NFIB’s “Opt In”
Compromise............................................................... 624
VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 626

Winter 2013]

SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM

545

I. INTRODUCTION
On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court issued one of its most
anticipated decisions in National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius (“NFIB”)1—the constitutional challenge to the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA” or the “Act”).2 The
ACA is President Obama’s signature accomplishment. It relies on a
host of reforms designed to reduce cost, improve the quality of
healthcare and health outcomes, and expand access to care. But the
linchpin of reform, and the piece receiving the overwhelming amount
of attention, is its attempt to improve healthcare access by expanding
public and private insurance coverage. Increased coverage should
help improve health outcomes and reduce healthcare costs by
ensuring that people can get access to the right kind of care at the
right time to help prevent illness or avoidable hospitalizations.3
Coverage also helps prevent the harmful cost shifting and rise in
costs that result from uncompensated medical treatment.4 The ACA
is the most significant expansion of coverage since Medicare and
Medicaid in 1965.
On the public side, the ACA broadens Medicaid eligibility.5
Traditionally, Medicaid only covered certain categories of the very
poor: children, pregnant women, people with disabilities, and some
parents of covered children. Though not explicitly labeled as such,

1. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
2. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in various sections
of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
3. See, e.g., Katherine Brandon, The President on Health Care: “We are Going to Get this
Done”, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 17, 2009, 5:42 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/
The-President-on-Health-Care-We-are-Going-to-Get-this-Done; see also Peter Orszag, To Save
Money, Save the Health Care Act, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at A29 (arguing that the ACA will
reduce healthcare costs); The Right Care at the Right Time: Leveraging Innovation to Improve
Health Care Quality for All Americans: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. 57–
69 (2008) (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office) (same).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(E) (2010) (“The economy loses up to $207,000,000,000 a year
because of the poorer health and shorter lifespan of the uninsured. By significantly reducing the
number of the uninsured, the requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will
significantly reduce this economic cost.”).
5. For a comprehensive overview of the ACA, see HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW [hereinafter SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM
LAW], available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8061.pdf (last modified Apr. 15,
2011), as well as Part II.A.1 of this Article.
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this line drawing seemed to reflect assumptions about who was
“deserving” of help, based in part on assumptions about the ability of
the working poor to pay for insurance. After decades of criticism that
Medicaid’s categories did not accurately reflect the reality of access
to employment-based or individual coverage in the private market,
the ACA expanded Medicaid eligibility to cover all adults who fall
below a certain income level.6 States’ responses were mixed: some
eagerly anticipated the federal money they would get to expand care,
and others decried the federal expansion as coercive of and
financially untenable for the states.7 As important as this expansion
was seen for future beneficiaries and states, however, it did not
receive nearly as much attention as the private insurance reforms.
Congress enacted a number of reforms designed to ensure access
to affordable insurance coverage in the private market. These
included the guaranteed-issue requirement, prohibition on preexisting condition exclusions, and rate regulation of insurance
premiums.8 The ACA also authorized creation of health benefit
exchanges, virtual-health-care markets used to facilitate consumer
enrollment in, and government oversight over, health plans.9 In
general, there seemed to be a great deal of public support for these
consumer protections.10 But a critical component of this reform—the
individual mandate—has been much less popular. The individual
mandate is the requirement that citizens either obtain insurance
coverage or make an annual “shared responsibility payment” to the
federal government.11 Policymakers considered the mandate
necessary to ensure that enough healthy people would join the
insurance pool to help spread the risk and keep insurance rates
down.12

6. See SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW, supra note 5.
7. See infra Part III.
8. SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW, supra note 5, at 5–6.
9. Id. at 4–6.
10. There is widespread support for other ACA protections that have already taken effect,
such as the under-twenty-six age requirement and the medical-loss ratio established to ensure that
plans spend at least a certain percentage of premiums on medical care. Id. at 6.
11. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius , 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012).
12. It does this by preventing adverse selection by consumers—that is, the process of
waiting until one is sick and needs insurance before entering the pool. See id. at 2585. Requiring
insurance companies to cover everyone regardless of risk at comparable pricing without a
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Minutes after the law was signed, the first legal challenge to
health reform was filed by Florida through its state attorney
general,13 joined thereafter by twelve other states’ attorneys general
or governors,14 two individual plaintiffs, and the National Federation
of Independent Business.15 Within two months, another dozen
lawsuits were filed by other states, businesses, individuals, and
private associations.16 Although various aspects of the reform law
were challenged, the overwhelming focus of the challenges was the
individual mandate: it proved to be a lightning rod for political and
legal challenges to the ACA as a whole.17
A key legal question that surfaced early in litigation was
whether the mandate was unconstitutional because Congress had
exceeded the scope of one of its enumerated powers under the
Constitution.18 The mandate was justified as an exercise of two
powers: Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce and its
power to tax and spend for the general welfare.19 Very quickly,
however, the focus of the constitutional question sharpened around
the commerce power issue: every court hearing the issue rejected the
taxing power justification, while a split emerged among the circuits
on the commerce question, making Supreme Court review
inevitable.20 This focus was also evident in much of the legal
scholarship, which viewed the mandate as reviving a longstanding
debate about federalism and the proper balance of federal–state
mandate would expose insurers to potentially exorbitant costs, which would lead to a “deathspiral” of insurers fleeing the market, undermining access goals. Id. at 2626 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
13. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256,
1263 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub
nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
14. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus, 132 S. Ct. at 2580. Eventually the number of state plaintiffs
rose to twenty-six. They included Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North
Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.; Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1240 n.2 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
15. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2580.
16. Id.
17. Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of
Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 1–2 (2011).
18. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2577.
19. Id. at 2584.
20. See infra Part II.B.2.
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power in the Commerce Clause.21 Reform opponents criticized the
ACA as a federal takeover that undermined states’ rights and the
mandate as a compelling example of how federal power threatened
individual liberties. “What’s next?” they asked, “Can the government
force us to eat broccoli, buy American-made cars, join a health
club?”22
In contrast to the mandate, the states’ challenge to the Medicaid
expansion received less attention. They claimed that requiring
participation in the expansion as a condition of existing Medicaid
funding was a coercive use of the federal government’s spending
power, which violated the Tenth Amendment’s prohibition on
federal usurpation of state authority or commandeering of state
legislative functions.23 This claim likely did not receive as much
attention because Medicaid is voluntary for states, courts have
routinely upheld amendments expanding eligibility, and the
challenge was not faring well in lower courts. Moreover, most
scholars seemed to agree that the spending power was incredibly
expansive and not a viable means through which to narrow federal
power.24 Consequently, many people were surprised when the
Supreme Court also granted certiorari on this issue.
Even after the Supreme Court agreed to hear both challenges,
commentary continued to focus the constitutional question and
federalism debate on the mandate as an exercise of the commerce
power.25 Reform proponents and opponents wondered whether the
Roberts Court would continue the trend of the Rehnquist Court in
narrowing federal power to strike down the mandate in the name of
21. See infra Part III.
22. See Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction & Brief in Support at 17–18, Thomas
More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-11156)
(claiming that upholding the mandate under the Commerce Clause would give the government
“unfettered power” to require private citizens “to engage in affirmative acts, . . . such as joining
health clubs, buying a GMC truck, or purchasing an AIG insurance policy”); see also James B.
Stewart, How Broccoli Landed on Supreme Court Menu, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2012, at A1
(describing Justice Scalia’s question in oral arguments to the government’s counsel asking
whether requiring Americans to buy health insurance could allow the government to force people
to buy other things that are good for them, such as broccoli).
23. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2601 (quoting New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
24. See infra Part III.B.
25. See infra Part III.
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federalism. The dominant narrative suggested a dichotomous choice:
Would the conservative majority—Chief Justice Roberts with
Justices Alito, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy—take this opportunity
to further limit federal power, or could the liberal wing of the Court
sway one of these Justices (most wrongly predicted Justice Kennedy)
to uphold the mandate? The Court ultimately defied this simplistic
narrative, and many expectations, by answering yes—to both.
By upholding the mandate and the ACA, the Court in NFIB
preserved a powerful new version of cooperative federalism in
healthcare—one that creates a federal platform for state
experimentation, innovation, and regulation to facilitate meaningful
choice in the private health insurance market. At the same time,
Chief Justice Roberts penned parts of the opinion that seemed more
consistent with federalism-based attacks on health reform and
demands for more robust limits on the government’s commerce and
spending powers.26 Of particular import was the Court’s
unprecedented finding that the Medicaid expansion was structured in
a coercive way and so could not be made a required condition of
Medicaid participation generally.27 NFIB gives states the choice to
opt in to the expansion or to refuse participation in it, creating
uncertainty for the poorest residents in states that have opposed
reform. More fundamentally, however, this holding raises questions
about whether the Spending Clause will now be seen as a more
viable site for federalism-based attacks, in general, and specifically if
this will be used to limit the federal government’s ability to adapt
spending conditions to changing realities in longstanding healthcare
programs like Medicaid and Medicare. The constitutional and health
policy implications of NFIB will likely be explored for years to
come, and this Article contributes to the beginning of this
exploration.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides an overview of
the public and private expansions of the ACA, as well as the political
and legal attacks mounted immediately after it was passed. Part III
describes the legal and political commentary leading up to NFIB,
highlighting the dominant narratives used to frame the challenges.

26. See infra Parts III & VI.
27. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2604, 2608.
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Parts IV and V explore the Court’s decision in NFIB in greater
detail. Part IV explains the rationale of a divided Court in upholding
the mandate. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion,
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, holding
that the individual coverage requirement was constitutional under the
taxing power. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito (the
“Joint Dissenters”) issued a joint dissent concluding that the mandate
could not be justified under the taxing power or the commerce
power. Chief Justice Roberts, this time writing for himself, also
concluded that the mandate would violate the Commerce Clause.
Part IV.A begins with the Commerce Clause holding because
this is where NFIB’s constitutional analysis begins, and this issue
received the most attention. This section highlights the importance of
the activity-inactivity distinction central to Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion and to the joint dissent. Although the Joint Dissenters did not
join the Chief Justice’s opinion on this issue, all five Justices made
clear that the commerce power does not permit Congress to “compel
the purchase of an unwanted product,” in this case health insurance.
Part IV.B looks more closely at the taxing-power justification
for the mandate, describing the Justices’ struggle over the proper
characterization of the shared responsibility payment as a “penalty”
(which must be justified under the commerce power) or a “tax”
(which can be easily satisfied under the broader taxing power). A
majority of the Court concluded that the shared responsibility
payment functions more like a tax on the choice not to buy insurance
than a true penalty that forces people to buy insurance.
Part V describes the rationale of a divided Court in upholding a
limited version of the Medicaid expansion based on its
unprecedented finding of coercion. Part V.A analyzes the coercion
holding. This time, seven Justices, in two separate opinions, found
the expansion as structured coercive. Central to this coercion finding
was the characterization of the expansion as a “new” and different
program, rather than an example of the typical eligibility expansions
upheld in the past. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer
and Kagan, and the Joint Dissenters, all expressed the concern that
states could not have anticipated this dramatic transformation and
that conditioning existing Medicaid funds on participation in this
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new program created a threat that served no purpose other than to
force unwilling states to participate. This threat, especially in light of
the amount of funding at risk, was coercive.
Part V.B describes the Court’s remedy for this violation, and this
is where the decision broke down along the familiar 5-4 divide.
Writing for a majority of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by
Justices Breyer, Kagan, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, held that the
Court could simply sever the coercive penalty provision and held that
Congress could not withdraw existing Medicaid funding from states
that refuse to participate in the expansion. The Court preserved the
expansion as an option for states and left the rest of the ACA intact.
Part VI explores the implications of NFIB. Part VI.A suggests
that NFIB raises important questions about the commerce power and
the power to tax and spend as future sites of federalism-based
attempts to limit federal power. It also considers the importance of
judicial restraint in how the Roberts Court defines its role in this
struggle. Part VI.B considers the potentially beneficial and harmful
implications for health reform implementation and the future of
health policy. This Article concludes by briefly describing future
challenges that may keep lawyers and commentators busy for some
time to come, but that cannot stop the implementation of reform that
is already underway.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE ACA AND
KEY PROVISIONS SUBJECT TO CHALLENGE
The linchpin of the ACA’s reform is its expansion of public and
private insurance coverage. Despite rhetoric describing the ACA as a
federal takeover, the ACA builds upon the existing private–public
patchwork of insurance coverage.28 The ACA assumes that people
already eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, or fortunate enough to
be covered through their employers, would keep that coverage.29 The
28. See, e.g., Alison Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented
Markets, and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 8 (2010) (“The individual mandate has been
held up as the ‘American’ way to achieve universal coverage, where every citizen can choose her
own insurance, and commercial insurers can compete for profit.”).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 18011 (2010) (preserving of the right to maintain existing coverage); see
also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION 13, 16, 18 tbl.1
(2012) [hereinafter “CBO ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE
ACA”], available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43472-07-242012-CoverageEstimates.pdf (estimating the effects of the ACA’s insurance coverage provisions
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ACA’s goal was to patch up some of the holes in this existing
scheme by increasing insurance options for those excluded from the
existing insurance market, either because coverage was unaffordable
or because they were considered too high risk and denied coverage.30
Nonetheless, the ACA has generated a wide range of political and
legal responses, including challenges to this expansion.
A. Insurance Expansion
in the ACA
1. Medicaid Expansion
The primary public reform is the expansion of Medicaid
eligibility. Medicaid is a joint federal–state program established in
1965 to facilitate healthcare access for the very poor.31 It is
voluntary: states have the option to receive federal matching funds
for healthcare services provided to Medicaid beneficiaries as long as
the states comply with federal program conditions.32 The federal

on health insurance coverage); Hoffman, supra note 28, at 8, 15 (noting that the ACA was
designed “to address the problem of [the] estimated 46 million uninsured Americans” and that the
ACA “envision[s] using government mandates to achieve universal coverage without
fundamentally restructuring the existing payment and delivery systems”). A number of studies
provide support for this assumption about employer-based coverage. See, e.g., DELOITTE CTR.
FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS & DELOITTE CONSULTING, 2012 DELOITTE SURVEY OF U.S.
EMPLOYERS: OPINIONS ABOUT THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM AND PLANS FOR EMPLOYEE
HEALTH BENEFITS 5 (2012), available at http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_US/us/Insights
/centers/center-for-health-solutions/21c1f310fb8b8310VgnVCM3000001c56f00aRCRD.htm?id
=us_furl_chs_employersurvey_072412 (finding that most employers do not intend to drop
coverage, but that for those that do, prohibitive cost would be the likely cause); KEN JACOBS ET
AL., RESEARCH BRIEF: NINE OUT OF TEN NON-ELDERLY CALIFORNIANS WILL BE INSURED
WHEN THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT IS FULLY IMPLEMENTED 3 (2012), available at
http://www.healthpolicy.ucla.edu/pubs/files/calsim_Exchange1.pdf
(using
the
California
Simulation of Insurance Markets (CalSIM) model to predict changes in healthcare coverage in
California under the ACA and finding a small decline in employer-based coverage).
30. See At Risk: Pre-Existing Conditions Could Affect One in Two Americans,
HEALTHCARE.GOV (last visited Nov. 8, 2012, 2:02 AM), http://www.healthcare.gov/law/
resources/reports/preexisting.html; see also Hoffman, supra note 28, at 8–9, 17–19, 60–63
(describing why the fragmented healthcare market leaves so many uninsured and critiquing
whether the ACA can effectively address this problem); Brandon, supra note 3 (noting President
Obama’s urgency in seeking health reform that would cover those with pre-existing conditions or
who were otherwise priced out of the insurance market).
31. See ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A
CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID 57, 61–62 (1974).
32. Id. at 57; HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED POLICY
BRIEF: A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF HOW STATES HAVE RESPONDED TO THE AVAILABILITY OF
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government establishes minimal requirements for participation with
respect to reimbursement, services provided, and eligibility criteria,
but these standards leave a great deal of discretion and flexibility to
the states, which are primarily responsible for program
administration.33 For example, although Medicaid mandates
coverage for certain categories of the very poor—children, pregnant
women, the disabled, and the elderly—it gives states flexibility to
cover “optional” categories.34 Over the years, there have also been
numerous amendments to expand eligibility criteria.35
In addition, states can seek a waiver to allow them to experiment
in ways that may not fully comply with the law but still further the
goal of providing healthcare to those in need in a cost-effective
way.36 The federal government has been quite generous in granting
states waivers from federal requirements, allowing a great deal of
state variation and freedom from federal constraint even beyond that
apparently anticipated in the law. States have used waivers to do
things like change delivery methods, alter benefits and cost sharing,
modify provider reimbursement, and increase the number of people
covered.37
FEDERAL FUNDS FOR HEALTH COVERAGE 2 (2012) [hereinafter HISTORICAL REVIEW OF
MEDICAID], available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8349.pdf.
33. STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 31, at 57–61. For example, subject to often vague
federal standards or guidance, states are the ones that actually set reimbursement rates for
healthcare providers, oversee the utilization review process for services, and determine whether
and how to extend coverage for groups or services that are deemed optional by the federal
government. See Brietta R. Clark, Medicaid Access, Rate Setting and Payment Suits: How the
Obama Administration is Undermining Its Own Health Reform Goals, 55 HOW. L.J. 771, 793–
804 (2012) (describing the state flexibility created by the Medicaid Act).
34. See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 31, at 61–65.
35. See Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting Structure and Meaning in a PostDeficit Reduction Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 16–18 (2006); see also ANDY
SCHNEIDER ET AL., THE KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE MEDICAID
RESOURCE BOOK app. I 175–77 (2002), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/
loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&pageid=14255 (outlining the “major changes
enacted by Congress since the initiation of Medicaid in 1965”).
36. See Clark, supra note 33, at 778–79.
37. See KAISER COMM’N ON KEY FACTS, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FIVE KEY
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT SECTION 1115 MEDICAID DEMONSTRATION WAIVERS:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (June 2011), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8196.pdf
(“Currently, 30 states and the District of Columbia operate one or more comprehensive Section
1115 Medicaid waivers that involved an estimated $54.6 billion in federal outlays in 2011. These
waivers generally fall into several categories, including waivers to implement managed care, to
expand coverage with limited benefits, to restructure federal financing, and to expand coverage to
low income adults in preparation for the Medicaid expansion in 2014.”); see also TIMOTHY
STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE
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The reality of this state–federal relationship is important to
understand for a few of reasons. First, every state participates in the
Medicaid program now because of the generous federal matching
funds and state flexibility.38 Second, states have been important
innovators in healthcare delivery and financing, experimenting with
managed care, medical homes and hospital consolidations, and
expanding clinics and outpatient care.39 Most importantly, the fact
that so many states look for ways to expand coverage beyond the
mandatory categories highlights the problem of a dysfunctional
system that continues to exclude so many people. Despite these statedriven reforms, many childless adults and the working poor remain
excluded; thus, Medicaid expansion was a logical part of reform.40
PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 172 (2003) (stating that Arizona, Tennessee, and
Oregon have adopted innovative approaches that have expanded coverage for the poor). Of
course, this flexibility allows states to cut optional programs or groups later. See VERNON K.
SMITH ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MOVING AHEAD AMID FISCAL CHALLENGES:
A LOOK AT MEDICAID SPENDING, COVERAGE AND POLICY TRENDS 7 (Oct. 2011) [hereinafter
MOVING AHEAD AMID FISCAL CHALLENGES], available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload
/8248.pdf (“Eighteen states in both [fiscal years] 2011 and 2012 reported eliminating, reducing or
restricting benefits. Elimination of, or limits on, dental, therapies, medical supplies and DME and
personal care services were most frequently reported.”); Abby Goodnough, Medicaid Cuts Are
Part of a Larger Battle in Maine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2011, at A11 (detailing Maine Governor
Paul R. LePage’s proposed cuts in “optional benefits, including dental care and room and board at
assisted living centers,” as well as his plan to make nineteen- and twenty-year-olds and childless
adults ineligible, which would reduce the Medicaid rolls by sixty-five thousand).
38. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF MEDICAID, supra note 32, at 1 (“Past experience shows that the
availability of federal funds has served as an effective incentive for states to provide health
coverage to meet the health and long-term care needs of their low-income residents despite state
budget pressures.”).
39. See generally LEIGHTON KU & CHRISTINE FERGUSON, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV.
SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH & HEALTH SERVS., MEDICAID WORKS: A REVIEW OF HOW PUBLIC
INSURANCE PROTECTS THE HEALTH AND FINANCES OF CHILDREN AND OTHER VULNERABLE
POPULATIONS 13 (June 2011), available at http://www.firstfocus.net/sites/default/files
/MedicaidWorks.pdf (providing background information on how states are acting as innovators in
healthcare delivery and financing).
40. See Rosenbaum, supra note 35, at 7 (“From a structural viewpoint, Medicaid can be
thought of as a logical response to the nation’s market-oriented approach to health care financing
and service delivery. Among industrial democracies, the United States stands alone in relying on
voluntary markets to insure most of the population. Voluntary markets inevitably exclude persons
who are unable to afford the going price or whose individual characteristics make them
unattractive customers. With the cost of employer-sponsored family coverage hovering at
$10,000 in 2004—among employers that elect to offer any coverage—private insurance is
unaffordable to millions of people. Millions more find themselves either entirely or substantially
barred from adequate coverage as a result of health problems that affect companies’ willingness
to offer coverage at any price. Medicaid, in short, stands as the nation’s central means of
compensating for the lack of a unified, population-based system of health care finance, the
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The ACA has expanded eligibility to all adults with an income
up to 133 percent of the federal poverty level, which is $15,415 per
year for a single adult or $31,809 per year for a family of four. 41 It
also created incredibly generous federal funding for these “newly
eligibles”: the federal government will fund 100 percent of most
states’ costs from 2014 until 2016 and then gradually decrease its
share to 90 percent in 2020 and thereafter.42 Thus, states’ share of the
cost is capped at 10 percent for services provided and only incidental
administrative expenses.43 When Congress passed the ACA, it
expected that all states would want to continue participating in
Medicaid and that the expansion would increase the insured by 15.9
million people by 2019.44 This was due, in part, to the generous
federal funding available, and, in part, to the fact that the ACA
required states that wanted to continue participating in Medicaid to
cover this additional group. Part V of this article explains how NFIB
has made this expansion optional.
2. Private Insurance Reforms
The private insurance provisions in the ACA were primarily
directed at reforming the healthcare market to ensure that individuals
and small businesses would have a meaningful choice of affordable

consequence of which is the total or partial exclusion of tens of millions of persons who tend to
be poorer and sicker than the norm.”); see also KRISTOF STREMIKIS ET AL., THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTH CARE OPINION LEADERS’ VIEWS ON VULNERABLE
POPULATIONS IN THE U.S. HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (2011), available at http://www
.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Data%20Brief/2011/Aug/1536_Stremikis_H
COL_vulnerable_populations_data_brief.pdf (“Ninety percent of [survey respondents] think the
current health system is unsuccessful in achieving equity on the whole . . . and surveyed leaders
agree that the [ACA] will be helpful in closing the health care divide.”).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(14)(l) (effective Feb. 22, 2012); see also HENRY J. HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., A GUIDE TO THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION ON THE ACA’S
MEDICAID EXPANSION 3 & n.10 (2012) [hereinafter “GUIDE TO THE SUPREME COURT’S
DECISION”], available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8347.pdf (providing a
comprehensive overview of the Medicaid expansion).
42. GUIDE TO THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION, supra 41, at 3.
43. Id.
44. JOHN HOLAHAN & IRENE HEADEN, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE
UNINSURED, MEDICAID COVERAGE AND SPENDING IN HEALTH REFORM: NATIONAL AND STATEBY-STATE RESULTS FOR ADULTS AT OR BELOW 133% FPL 2 (2010), available at
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/medicaid-coverage-and-spending-in-health-reformnational-and-state-by-state-results-for-adults-at-or-below-133-fpl.pdf; see also CBO ESTIMATES
FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE ACA, supra note 29, at 1 (explaining that
the CBO estimates assumed that every state would expand eligibility).
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insurance options.45 The existing market is segmented into many
different groups, each with different protections and access to care.
Certain populations can access care through public entitlement
programs, as seniors can through Medicare or the groups mentioned
above through Medicaid.46 In the insurance market for employmentbased insurance, employees also benefit from special legal
protections for members of group plans. For example, employers get
tax incentives to provide health insurance as a form of compensation,
which means that employees are typically only responsible for
paying a portion of the premium.47 Insurers have also been
prohibited from denying or pricing an employee’s policy based on
that employee’s risk, which spreads the risk.48 These protections,
along with employers’ bargaining power and the fact that employees
tend to be healthy, have helped keep insurance affordable, especially
for those employed in mid- to large-sized firms.
Others have been left to fend for themselves in a private market
where profit-driven insurers are free to deny coverage or price
policies based on individual risk. Prior to the ACA, people in the
individual market did not get the same kind of rating protection or
tax benefits that would help make coverage affordable,49 contributing
to the problem of a growing uninsured population. There was also
the problem of underinsurance: some plans that were affordable had
such high deductibles and offered such skimpy coverage that people
discovered they could not afford the treatment they needed until it
was too late.50 The ACA is designed to eliminate market
impediments to affordable and meaningful coverage and is based on

45. See Brandon, supra note 3.
46. See generally STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 31, at 57 (providing a case-study
analysis of the Medicaid program, its genesis, implementation, and the populations it covers).
47. See Hoffman, supra note 28, at 56–57.
48. Id. at 55–57.
49. See, e.g., id. at 50–57.
50. See Jay Hancock, The New Normal in Health Insurance: High Deductibles, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (June 3, 2012), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2012/June/04/high
-deductible-health-insurance.aspx; Hazardous Health Plans: Coverage Gaps Can Leave You in
Big Trouble, CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG, available at http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/
2012/05/hazardous-health-plans/index.htm (last updated May 2009).
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three pillars of reform: (1) consumer protections; (2) shared
responsibility; and (3) the creation of a health benefit exchange.51
a. Consumer protections
There are a number of consumer protections designed to ensure
consumers’ access to affordable and meaningful insurance coverage.
The guaranteed-issue requirement and prohibitions on pre-existing
condition exclusions remove structural barriers to insurance.52
Community rating requirements that spread risk more evenly among
higher and lower risk individuals, and rate regulation designed to
better align premiums with the amount of care and value of coverage
provided, improve access by making insurance affordable.53 Finally,
to ensure meaningful coverage, the law includes a number of
protections, including prohibitions on caps for certain services and
annual limits, rules on cost-sharing limits for preventive and other
kinds of services, and a minimal set of “essential benefits” that plans
must cover.54 The ACA also tries to improve coverage for groups
that have historically fallen through the gaps of the insurance market
(like young adults) and those disproportionately impacted by certain
exclusions (like women and people living with HIV/AIDS).55
b. Shared responsibility and
the individual mandate
The shared responsibility aspect of reform spells out how
various actors will help pay for or contribute to this new system,
including the government, employers, and individuals. The federal
51. See SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW, supra note 5, at 1.
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 to -5 (Supp. IV 2007–2011).
53. See id. § 300gg.
54. Id. § 300gg-6; id. § 300gg-11; id. § 18021
55. See, e.g., id. 300gg-14 (extending dependent coverage for young adults up to age twenty
six); see also INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS
18 (2011) (“The ACA has the potential to transform the way in which the U.S. health care system
addresses women’s health issues in many ways. It expands access to coverage to millions of
uninsured women, ends discriminatory practices such as gender rating in the insurance market,
eliminates exclusions for preexisting conditions, and improves women’s access to affordable,
necessary care. The Women’s Health Amendment . . . introduced by Senator Barbara Mikulski
and which was added to the ACA, expands on these improvements by requiring that all private
health plans cover—with no cost-sharing requirements—a newly identified set of preventive
health care services for women.”); JEFFREY S. CROWLEY & JEN KATES, THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT, THE SUPREME COURT, AND HIV: WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS? (2012), available at
http://www.kff.org/hivaids/upload/8363.pdf (describing the different provisions in the ACA that
will help increase access to HIV and AIDS treatment).
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government helps by providing subsidies for people who may not be
able to afford insurance on their own and tax credits for small
businesses with no more than twenty-five employees.56 Employers
with fifty or more employees are expected to help by either
providing the option for employment-based coverage or paying an
assessment based on the number of employees seeking insurance
through the exchange.57 Individuals can meet their responsibility
either by purchasing insurance from a qualified health plan (the
“mandate”) or by making a shared responsibility payment (also
called a “penalty”).58 This mandate or penalty aspect of the reform
has generated the most controversy.
The President, then-Senator Obama, campaigned in 2008 against
the individual mandate but was convinced thereafter about its
necessity.59 Benefits and responsibility must go hand-in-hand: it is
necessary to require citizens to obtain insurance coverage to ensure
that healthy people are part of the insurance pool to help spread the
risk. This guards against adverse selection by consumers, which is
the process of waiting until one is sick or in need of insurance before
entering the pool. Requiring insurance companies to cover everyone
at generally comparable pricing, without a mandate, could lead to a
“death spiral” of insurers fleeing the market, undermining access
goals.60 Indeed, this is exactly what happened in states that tried this
without a mandate; Massachusetts has been successful because its
reform included a mandate, which is why it served as the model for
the ACA.61

56. See SUMMARY OF HEALTH REFORM LAW, supra note 5, at 2–3.
57. See id. at 1.
58. See id. at 1; see also 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2011) (describing the requirement to maintain
minimum essential coverage); 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2005) (describing congressional findings as to
the requirement to maintain minimum essential coverage).
59. See Andrew Cline, How Obama Broke His Promise on Individual Mandates, THE
ATLANTIC (June 29, 2012, 12:36 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/06/howobama-broke-his-promise-on-individual-mandates/259183/.
60. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2614 (2012).
61. Id.
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c. Health benefit exchanges
and the role of states
A health benefit exchange is the mechanism through which this
new system of benefits and responsibility will be realized.62 The
ACA gives states two options: states can get federal funding to help
them create their own exchanges, or, if they choose not to participate,
the federal government will create a federal exchange for people in
states without one.63 Federal regulators will play an important role in
helping to guide states about what the ACA requires, but both the
ACA and the approach of federal regulators reflect the kind of
flexibility and deference to state discretion that has been typical of
the federal–state partnership in Medicaid.64
States that choose to participate will have the power to define a
number of elements of reform, including the essential minimum
benefits that must be provided by all qualified health plans, costsharing and tiered options offered by plans, systems for eligibility
screening and enrollment, and consumer assistance plans.65 The
exchanges will ensure that required disclosures about plan content
and rates are made and that information provided to consumers is
clear and unbiased.66 The ACA also requires that exchanges seek and
use input from key stakeholders (including individual consumers,
consumer advocates, the business community, healthcare providers,
and health plans) in making these decisions, but states have a great
deal of discretion about how to do this.67 These are just a few
62. See SABRINA CORLETTE, JOANN VOLK & KEVIN LUCIA, THE CTR. ON HEALTH INS.
REFORMS & NAT’L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., PLAN MANAGEMENT: ISSUES FOR STATE, PARTNERSHIP
AND FEDERALLY FACILITATED HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES 1–3 (2012), available at
https://gushare.georgetown.edu/xythoswfs/webui/_xy-8409729_2-t_aPsiEpMD (describing the
exchange as the “lynchpin” of the ACA’s provisions to expand access to quality, affordable
coverage).
63. See id. at 1; see also 42 U.S.C. § 18041 (2006) (describing state obligations in
administering the exchanges).
64. See generally MICAH WEINBERG & LEIF WELLINGTON HAASE, THE COMMONWEALTH
FUND, STATE-BASED COVERAGE SOLUTIONS: THE CALIFORNIA HEALTH BENEFIT EXCHANGE
(2011), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%
20Brief/2011/May/1507_Weinberg_california_hlt_benefit_exchange_ib.pdf (documenting and
analyzing the state-based coverage solutions chosen by California in adopting its exchange);
CORLETTE, VOLK & LUCIA, supra note 62 (describing the flexible approaches that states have in
establishing exchanges under the ACA).
65. See CORLETTE, VOLK & LUCIA, supra note 62.
66. See id. at 12–15.
67. 45 C.F.R. § 155.130 (2012)); see also THE CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS.
OVERSIGHT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BLUEPRINT FOR APPROVAL OF
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examples of the active role states can have in shaping health reform
implementation. Moreover, just as in the Medicaid context, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) has indicated a
willingness to consider waivers for states or insurers that need more
time to adjust to new requirements.68
B. Responses and Legal
Challenges to Reform
In light of the media attention to the political and legal
challenges to healthcare reform, one could easily get the impression
that the reforms are wildly unpopular. In fact, the ACA reforms have
yielded a range of responses from states and the public generally.
Some states have welcomed the reforms, eagerly anticipating
Medicaid funding to help them expand coverage69 and moving
quickly to take advantage of the funding available for the creation of
the exchanges.70 Notably, there has been bipartisan support in these
states.71

AFFORDABLE STATE-BASED AND STATE PARTNERSHIP INSURANCE EXCHANGES 21–25 (2012),
available at http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/hie-blueprint-081312.pdf (outlining suggested
requirements for exchanges in engaging stakeholders).
68. See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Rhetoric Hits the Road: State Challenges to the
Affordable Care Act Implementation, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 781, 806–07 (2012) (noting the
responsiveness of the HHS to state insurance commissioners and the significant state flexibility
that HHS has given in the form of waivers for certain insurance regulations).
69. See KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., HOW IS THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT LEADING TO CHANGES IN MEDICAID TODAY? 1
(May 2010), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8312.pdf.
70. The federal government has issued more than $1.6 billion in grants. See Health
Insurance Exchange Establishment Grants, 2012, STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, http://
statehealthfacts.kff.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=954&cat=17 (last visited Oct. 1, 2012); see also
State Actions to Address Health Insurance Exchanges, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/state-actions-to-implement-the-health
-benefit-exch.aspx (last updated Oct. 2012) (providing an overview of how states plan to
implement the exchange requirements of the ACA).
71. See, e.g., WEINBERG & HAASE, supra note 64, at 3 (noting that in California there “was
a great deal of accord among the principals and staff of the Democratic-controlled legislature and
the Republican Schwarzenegger administration, and the legislative process moved very quickly”);
Colorado First State to Pass Exchange Legislation with Bipartisan Support, STATE HEALTH
ACCESS DATA ASSISTANCE CTR. (June 3, 2011), http://www.shadac.org/blog/colorado-first-state
-pass-exchange-legislation-bipartisan-support; see also Abby Goodnough, Liking It or Not, States
Prepare for Health Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2012, at A1 (“Republicans who support state-run
exchanges say they are embracing a fundamental conservative belief: that states should make
their own decisions rather than cede control to the federal government.”).
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Other states are supportive of reforms but have taken a more
cautious approach. Uncertainty about the fate of reform made some
states wary of making any investments initially.72 Some doubt their
capacity to establish a health benefit exchange and maintain it once
federal funding is no longer available.73 Finally, financial concerns
make some states reticent to expand Medicaid despite generous
federal funding; what appears to be a relatively small share of the
cost is still significant in light of the numbers of newly eligible and
the serious budgetary challenges the states face.74 Nonetheless, states
that did not initially embrace reform are finding it difficult to resist
the generous funding and are reconsidering their position.75 There is
also evidence of significant support among individuals and small
businesses for consumer protections—like the guaranteed-issue
requirement and prohibition on pre-existing condition exclusions—
and federal subsidies and tax credits.76 Predictably, the mandate has
been more controversial.77
72. See Timing Matters: States Waiting for a Supreme Court Decision to Plan an Exchange,
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (May 25, 2012), http://www.kff.org/healthreform/
quicktake_SCOTUS_exchanges.cfm.
73. HHS created another option for these states: a federal–state exchange option that gives
states the flexibility to decide which aspects of reform implementation it would like to oversee
and which it would like the federal government to undertake. See THE CTR. FOR CONSUMER
INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, supra note 67.
74. See Dan Diamond, How Much Will States’ Medicaid Expansions Really Cost?,
CALIFORNIA HEALTHLINE (July 18, 2012), http://www.californiahealthline.org/road-to-reform/
2012/how-much-will-states-medicaid-expansions-really-cost.aspx; see also KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., UPDATE: STATE BUDGETS IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY (2011), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8253.pdf (analyzing recent trends in state government
finances).
75. See Goodnough, supra note 71 (noting that some Republican state leaders are having
“underground” discussions about establishing exchanges); see also Tom Cohen, Some States Not
Changing Course Amid Rising Tide of Health Care Reform, CNN (July 4, 2012, 7:54 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/04/politics/health-care-states/index.html (noting that even for states
with conservative lawmakers ideologically opposed to reform, the financial incentives may create
an offer too good to refuse).
76. See Patricia Zengerle, Most Americans Oppose Health Law But Like Provisions,
REUTERS (June 24, 2012, 1:13 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/24/us-usa
-campaign-healthcare-idUSBRE85N01M20120624; J.D. Harrison, Mixed Emotions: Small
Business Owners, Advocates Respond to Health-care Ruling, WASH. POST (June 28, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-small-business/mixed-emotions-small-business
-owners-advocates-respond-to-health-care-ruling/2012/06/28/gJQAALaI9V_story.html; see also
NPR, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, THE PUBLIC ON
REQUIRING INDIVIDUALS TO HAVE HEALTH INSURANCE (Feb. 2008), available at http://www
.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/7754.pdf (investigating public sentiments about healthcare reform).
77. See NPR, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, supra
note 76. In a recent poll about health reform, the only individual element to garner substantially
unfavorable views was the mandate/penalty provision. Id. But the poll also found that six in ten
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States, individuals, organizations, and lawmakers opposed to
reform have been extremely vocal, attacking reform on every front.
At the federal level, Republican politicians have threatened repeal as
well as other obstructionist political measures, such as defunding and
the use of legislative hearings, to impede reform implementation.78
Some Republican-led states announced their refusal to participate in
the private or public insurance expansion, with the individual
mandate serving as the focal point of these attacks.79 Others have
gone even further, passing nullification legislation to obstruct federal
reform efforts.80
But the most pervasive and viable form of attack has been legal
challenges filed by individuals, business associations, religious
organizations, and states81 in courts throughout the country. These

people support a broad approach to ensure everyone has coverage, which includes an individual
mandate. Id. For some, support for the mandate seemed tied to expansion of public insurance and
the availability of subsidies. For those opposing a mandate, the main reason for opposition was
concern about people being forced to buy insurance if they cannot afford it. Id.
78. Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Role of State Resistance in
Health Care Decision-Making, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 73, 73–74 (2011).
79. See Richard Cauchi, State Legislation and Actions Challenging Certain Health Reforms,
NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/state-lawsand-actions-challenging-ppaca.aspx (last updated Oct. 19, 2012) (detailing in Table 1 the state
laws challenging or opting out of the insurance reforms).
80. See Cauchi, supra note 79 (describing the various state measures enacted or proposed by
members of at least forty-seven state legislatures to “limit, alter or oppose selected state or federal
actions” relating to health reform, but also noting that “because the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the individual coverage mandate, which does not require a state role, the federal law fully applies
and any contradictory state laws will have no current effect on [ACA] provisions”). Seven states
have also recently enacted laws intended to create “Interstate Health Compacts.” Id. “[T]hese take
a first step toward allowing a group of states to join together to establish broad health care
programs that operate outside of the [ACA] or other federal law. However, these compacts do not
block [ACA] implementation, and are not yet binding; they will require congressional approval
because they seek to substitute state control where federal law and regulations exist. These states
(including Georgia, Indiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah and Texas) aim to obtain,
‘primary responsibility for regulating health care goods and services’ within their boundaries.” Id.
Some states, including Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, Utah, and Wyoming, have taken
extreme measures, passing legislation barring any state official from assisting the federal
government with reform efforts. See id.
81. Importantly, within these states, there was internal divide about reform, often along party
lines. See Charles Monaco, In the States, Voices of Determination on Implementing Obamacare,
PROGRESSIVE STATES NETWORK (July 9, 2012, 6:07 PM), http://www.progressivestates.org/
news/blog/in-the-states-voices-determination-on-implementing-obamacare (describing efforts by
the Working Group of State Legislators for Health Reform to support reform, including two
amicus briefs filed by more than five hundred state lawmakers from all fifty states arguing that
the mandate and Medicaid expansion are constitutional); see also Brief Amici Curiae of State

Winter 2013]

SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM

563

challenges overwhelmingly focused on the constitutionality of the
individual mandate, but other aspects of the reform—including the
Medicaid expansion, employer mandate, and state-exchange
option—were also challenged.
1. Claims That Did Not Reach the Supreme Court:
What NFIB Is Not About
A number of challenges were raised in the lower courts that
never gained traction and were easily dismissed for failure to state a
proper claim. For example, states challenged the employer mandate
provision as applied to state employers: it would require large state
employers to offer and automatically enroll state employees in
federally approved insurance plans or else face substantial penalties
and assessments.82 States alleged that the employer mandate not only
violated Congress’s interstate commerce power, but also violated the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments by infringing on state sovereignty.
These claims were easily dismissed based on longstanding precedent
allowing similar regulation of state employers.83
States also challenged the creation of the health benefit
exchanges on similar state sovereignty grounds, despite the fact that
the ACA does not require states to operate an exchange. They argued
that they were being coerced into operating the exchange “under
threat of [the federal government] removing or significantly
curtailing their long-held regulatory authority” that federal regulation

Legislators from the Fifty States et al. Supporting Respondents (Medicaid), Florida v. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400), 2012 WL 588461 (arguing in favor
of upholding the ACA). For Iowa and Washington, this dispute resulted in these states appearing
on both sides of the challenge to health reform. After Washington state’s attorney general,
Republican Rob McKenna, joined the multistate challenge in Florida ex rel. Attorney General v.
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, the state’s Democratic governor, Cris Gregoire,
criticized the move as not representing the best interests of Washington residents, and the
Governor filed an amicus brief in support of the reform. Amicus Brief of the Governor of
Washington Christine Gregoire in Support of Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision), Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 160228. In
Iowa, the governor caused the state to join the challenge, but attorney general Tom Miller signed
an amicus brief, also on behalf of Iowa, in support of health reform. Brief of the States of
Maryland et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v.
Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 160230.
82. See Cauchi, supra note 79.
83. See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235
(11th Cir. 2011) (granting summary judgment); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529
(6th Cir. 2011) (denying plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction), abrogated by Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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of insurance markets would “‘displace State authority over a
substantial segment of intrastate insurance regulation . . . that the
States have always possessed under the police powers provided in
the Constitution.’”84 These, too, were easily dismissed based on
longstanding precedent recognizing the federal government’s power
to regulate in the area of health and safety under its commerce and
spending powers. The Court viewed this state exchange option as
precisely the kind of voluntary federal–state partnership used in other
programs—like Medicaid—and permitted under the Constitution.85
Finally, with respect to the individual mandate, individual
plaintiffs and religious organizations brought challenges claiming
infringements on constitutionally protected rights, but these have not
fared any better.86 For example, in Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, the district court
dismissed plaintiffs’ challenge to the mandate on substantive due
process grounds.87 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ broad
characterization of fundamental rights as including the “freedom to
eschew entering into a contract, to direct matters concerning
dependent children, and to make decisions regarding the acquisition
and use of medical services,” all of which they claimed the mandate

84. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F.
Supp. 2d 1120, 1151–54 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (dismissing the challenge for failure to state a claim);
Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 636–37 (W.D. Va. 2010) (rejecting a Tenth
Amendment challenge to provisions in the ACA under which the federal government will either
set up its own exchange to facilitate the regulation and sale of insurance or give states the option
to set up its own under certain conditions because states are given a choice).
85. See McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1155 (citations omitted) (analogizing to a case
upholding similar federal legislation to create a nationwide program to protect the environment
that created “‘a program of cooperative federalism that allows the States, within limits established
by federal minimum standards, to enact and administer their own regulatory programs, structured
to meet their own particular needs,’” and noting that a “wealth of precedent” makes clear that the
federal government has this power); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882
(E.D. Mich. 2010) (dismissing district plaintiff’s first and second claims for relief and denying
plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction).
86. See, e.g., McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1120, 1161–62 (rejecting a substantive due
process challenge and finding that the mandate does not implicate any of the fundamental rights
that would merit closer scrutiny); Liberty Univ., 753 F. Supp. 2d at 637–47 (rejecting challenges
to the ACA based on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Free Exercise,
Establishment, Free Speech and Association, and Equal Protection clauses of the U.S.
Constitution).
87. McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1161–62.
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would violate.88 Rather, the court held that “[f]undamental rights are
a narrow class of rights involving the right to marry, have children,
direct the education of those children, marital privacy, contraception,
bodily integrity, and abortion; and the Supreme Court is ‘very
reluctant to expand’ that list.”89
2. Questions Reaching the
Supreme Court in NFIB
Plaintiffs had more success challenging the mandate as
exceeding the Article I powers that Congress used to justify it.
Congress’s primary justification for the mandate was its power to
regulate interstate commerce.90 This argument seemed to generate
the most debate among legal scholars and commentators in the media
because it was considered a novel question that could go either
way.91 This view was reinforced by the split that surfaced between
the circuit courts of appeals, making Supreme Court review
inevitable.92
Alternatively, the federal government argued that the mandate
could also be upheld as an exercise of Congress’s taxing power.93
This claim received less attention by commentators and was viewed
as much weaker by courts; no lower court upheld the mandate on this
basis because the shared responsibility payment used to enforce the
mandate was labeled a penalty that must be justified under the
commerce power, not a tax subject to the broader power to tax and
spend for the general welfare.94 Nonetheless, the issue ultimately
ended up before the Supreme Court.
88. Id. at 1161 (quoting Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss at 43–44, McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT)).
89. Id. at 1161–62 (quoting Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1343 (11th Cir. 2005)).
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2006).
91. See, e.g., Mark Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 1825, 1827–29 (2011); Stewart, supra note 22; Kevin Sack, Florida Suit Poses a
Challenge to Health Care Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2010, at A10.
92. Compare Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 549 (6th Cir. 2011)
(upholding the mandate under the commerce power), abrogated by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), with Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that the individual mandate
exceeded Congress’s commerce power), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
93. Reply Brief for Petitioner (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 21–25, Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 748426, at *21–25.
94. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1314 (“Beginning with the district court in this
case, all have found, without exception, that the individual mandate operates as a regulatory

566

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:541

Finally, the Medicaid challenge also reached the Supreme Court,
despite the fact that lower courts treated this challenge almost as
dismissively as the nonsurviving claims described above. Only Judge
Roger Vinson of the Northern District of Florida, and then the
Eleventh Circuit on appeal, viewed this claim as plausible enough to
survive a motion to dismiss, but both ultimately rejected it.95 The
lack of attention to this issue by legal scholars, mainstream media,
and even jurists affirmed a growing consensus that this claim was not
viable.96 Consequently, it came as quite a surprise to many when the
Court eventually granted certiorari on the issue.
These challenges reached the Supreme Court in the case of
NFIB, and the Court granted certiorari on four questions. As just
noted, two of the questions focused on the constitutionality of the
individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion.97 One of the other
questions was a threshold procedural question that the Court had to
answer before it could hear the substantive challenge to the mandate:
whether the challenge was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act
(“AIA”).98 As described further in Part IV.B, the AIA essentially
prevents taxpayers from bringing suits to challenge a tax before they
pay it. Like the constitutional question about whether the mandate
could be justified as an exercise of the taxing power, this question
turned on whether the proper characterization of the “shared
responsibility payment” was as a tax or penalty. If the payment was
properly viewed as a tax, then the AIA would bar plaintiffs from
challenging it until 2015 (the earliest that a shared responsibility
payment would be due). Although the federal government did not
raise this claim at the appellate level, the Court took up the question.
The Court also granted certiorari on the issue of severability.
Specifically, plaintiffs argued that if the individual mandate had been
found unconstitutional, the entire law would have to fall because the
mandate was an essential part of the reform and could not be severed
penalty, not a tax.”). But see infra note 160 (citing articles that argued that the taxing power was
either an equally viable or even stronger justification for upholding the mandate prior to NFIB).
95. Id. at 1240–41.
96. See infra Part III. But see infra note 162 (noting an exception to the dominant scholarly
discourse, which viewed the spending power as escaping meaningful Tenth Amendment limits).
97. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012).
98. Id. at 2582.
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from the Act.99 The severability question argued in the lower courts,
as well as the specific question on which the Court granted certiorari,
assumed that the issue would arise because of the mandate being
found unconstitutional.100 As described further in Parts IV and V,
however, because the mandate was held constitutional, the Court
ultimately had to consider the severability question in light of its
Medicaid holding.
III. THE DOMINANT NARRATIVE
IN THE HEALTH REFORM DEBATE
Two themes have pervaded the dominant narrative in the health
reform debate. First, in the legal debates on the mandate, the most
vocal opponents of reform have staked out their position as
protectors of federalism, while casting those who defend federal
power as nationalists who look to the federal government to solve
every problem.101 These federalism-based concerns derive from the
structure of our government as one of dual sovereignty, in which the
federal government’s power is limited and arises from specific
enumerated powers in Article I of the Constitution, and the states are
granted plenary power to regulate. The Tenth Amendment, which
provides that all rights not expressly granted to the federal
government are otherwise retained by the states and the people, is
viewed by some as an important check on federal power.102 In this
narrative, federalists not only are concerned with fidelity to the
constitutional principles of limited government as necessary for
protecting states’ rights, but they also see states’ rights as a proxy for
individual liberty.103 Federal power is viewed as an inherent threat to

99. Reply Brief for Private Petitioners on Severability at 18, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132
S. Ct. 2566 (Nos. 11-393 & 11-400), 2012 WL 864595 at *18.
100. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011) (granting certiorari limited to the issue
of severability presented by Question 3 of the petition). Question 3 for Petition No. 11-400
focused on whether the mandate, if held unconstitutional, could be severed from the rest of the
law. On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (No. 11398).
101. See generally Leonard, supra note 68 (discussing the rhetoric of federalism as states’
response to the ACA); Mario Loyola, Trojan Horse: Federal Manipulation of State Governments
and the Supreme Court’s Emerging Doctrine of Federalism, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 113 (2011)
(discussing the tension between nationalism and federalism).
102. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
103. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 22.
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states and individual liberty, and opposition to reform protects these
federalist principles.
Second, the narrative leading up to NFIB focused largely on the
mandate as a valid exercise of the commerce power. Disconnected
from the rest of reform, the mandate proved to be an easy target for
attack. As a result, messages about how reform would actually serve
federalism interests were diluted. Finally, the focus on the commerce
power meant that the scope and limits of the federal government’s
power to tax and spend as tools for insurance expansion went
underexplored prior to NFIB.
A. Safeguarding Federalism by
Limiting Federal Power
1. The Political Narrative
Politically, opponents of reform have used the rhetoric of
federalism to justify their attempts to undermine healthcare reform.
They paint reform as a federal takeover of healthcare, using terms
like “Obamacare” and inflammatory rhetoric about how the mandate
will lead to the destruction of civilization as we know it.104 Indeed
some of this rhetoric even made its way into legal briefs and court
decisions, making dire predictions of a parade of horribles that would
result if the mandate were to be upheld:
[T]he federal government will have the absolute and
unfettered power to create complex regulatory schemes to
fix every perceived problem imaginable and to do so by
ordering private citizens to engage in affirmative acts, under
penalty of law, such as taking vitamins, losing weight,
joining health clubs, buying a GMC truck, or purchasing an
AIG insurance policy, among others. The term “Nanny
104. See Leonard, supra note 68, at 820–21 (noting the partisan rhetoric that has accompanied
state resistance to health reform); Stewart, supra note 22 (describing how a video title “Wheat,
Weed and Obamacare: How the Commerce Clause Made Congress All-Powerful” was used to
cast defenders of the government’s power to enact the ACA as creating “an unlimited, amorphous
government that can make us do whatever it wants,” and how broccoli became the defining
symbol of this power); see also REPUBLICAN STUDY COMMITTEE, HOUSE REPUBLICAN
RESPONSES TO OBAMACARE 2 (2010), available at http://rsc.jordan.house.gov/uploadedfiles
/rsc_solutions_in_response_to_obamacare_sept2010.pdf (describing a “Democrats’ government
takeover of health care” and passage of “Obamacare” as a “monstrosity of a law”).
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State” does not even begin to describe what we will have
wrought if in fact the Health Care Reform Act falls within
any imaginable governmental authority. To be sure, George
Orwell’s 1984 will be just the primer for our new civics.105
These arguments reflect a recurring theme of federal power as a
threat to individual liberty, which has been explained in varied ways
as based on an individual’s right to make his/her own decisions, to be
free from compulsory participation in a socialized medical system,
and to be free from infringements on religious liberty.106 States’
resistance to reform centered on the mandate despite the fact that the
mandate did not directly implicate their interests. In this narrative,
states’ objections were premised on their role in protecting their
residents’ liberty.107
Another theme reflected in these arguments is the idea that
reform essentially steps on the states’ turf. States used this to explain
their vehement opposition to the health benefit exchanges and the
individual mandate—despite the fact that the exchanges are optional
and that the federal government has a long history of creating health
policy.108 States portrayed themselves not only as fighting for their
own sovereign power, but also as protectors of the people’s ability to
govern themselves.109 This notion of a sphere of state regulation that
should be off-limits to federal power was also the basis on which
105. See Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction & Brief in Support at 17–18, Thomas
More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (2011) (No. 2:10-cv-11156).
106. See, e.g., Richard M. Salsman, A Finalized Path to Full, Socialized Medicine in
America—Thanks to Conservatives, FORBES MAGAZINE (June 28, 2012) http://www.forbes.com
/sites/richardsalsman/2012/06/28/a-finalized-path-to-full-socialized-medicine-in-america-thanksto-conservatives; Jedidiah Purdy & Neil Siegel, The Liberty of Free Riders: The Minimum
Coverage Provision, Mill’s “Harm Principle,” and American Social Morality, 38 AM. J.L. AND
MED. 374, 376–79 (2012); see also supra Part II.B.1 (detailing legal challenges to healthcare
reform).
107. See, e.g., Cauchi, supra note 79 (providing an overview of various state nullification
laws). In Wyoming, a proposed constitutional amendment “states that residents have the right to
make their own health care decisions, while ‘any person may pay, and a health care provider may
accept, direct payment for health care without imposition of penalties or fines for doing so.’ [It]
[a]lso provides that the state ‘shall act to preserve these rights from undue governmental
infringement.’” Id. (internal citations omitted) In Tennessee, a statute declares a “public policy
that every person within the state ‘shall be free to choose or to decline to choose any mode of
securing health care services without penalty or threat of penalty;’ [and] requires that no state or
local public official, employee, or agent ‘shall act to impose, collect, enforce, or effectuate any
penalty in this state.’” Id. (internal citations omitted).
108. Brief of State Respondents as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11–12, Nat’l Fed’n
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398).
109. Id.
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hopeful Republican candidate Mitt Romney tried to distinguish the
reform enacted in Massachusetts under his leadership from
“Obamacare.”110
The problem with this political narrative is that it does not
reflect a realistic understanding of the legal scope of federal power or
the federal–state balance critical to existing health policy. As noted
in Part II.B, lower courts rejected individual rights-based claims, as
well as state claims based on antiquated notions of a uniquely state
sphere of regulatory power. Rather, the only viable challenge to
reform on the private side was to the individual mandate and whether
Congress exceeded the Article I powers it used to justify the
mandate: the power to regulate interstate commerce and the power to
tax and spend.111 Since 1937, these powers have been successfully
used by the federal government to vastly expand its regulatory reach
into almost every area affecting one’s daily life, including labor,
education, the environment, public safety, and, of course, healthcare
financing and delivery.112
This expansion does not mean that there are no limits on federal
power. But the absolutist rhetoric in the political narrative has not
accurately reflected these limits. Federalism-based concerns also
played a prominent role among legal scholars weighing in on the
health reform debate, but their arguments reflected a more nuanced
discussion of the proper balance of federal–state power.
2. The Legal Narrative
Framing federalism as a “choice between federal and state
action [as] simply binary”—with states and the federal government
having “exclusive” powers—has long been rejected, even by
scholars professing federalist concerns.113 Yet, these scholars insist
that our federalism structure creates a “preference” for decentralized
110. Robert I. Field, Obamacare v. Romneycare: Is There a Difference?, PHILLY.COM
(Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/fieldclinic/Obamacare-vs-Romneycare-Isthere-a-difference.html.
111. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2584–91.
112. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause CounterRevolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 888–94 (2005).
113. See Jonathan H. Adler, Cooperation, Commandeering, or Crowding Out? Federal
Intervention and State Choices in Health Care Policy, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 207
(2011).
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decision making and a “presumption” against federal regulation.114 A
number of theories have been offered to justify this presumption.
One of the most common is that limits on federal power foster local
experimentation and thus innovation.115 Another is that state
sovereignty ensures that decisions impacting people’s lives will be
made at the state level, ensuring better local participation and clear
political accountability.116 This, in turn, is viewed as enabling people
to protect themselves and thus their liberty. For example, Baker and
Berman assert:
A state’s freedom from federal interference, like an
individual’s freedom from governmental restrictions on
expression or private choices, is a freedom to make choices,
not just a freedom to choose wisely. That is, federalism,
including judicially enforced limits on Congress’s spending
power, seeks to create a space within which a subnational
political community can make choices about how to govern
itself without interference from the national government.
This is out of respect not for the autonomy or dignity of
states qua states, but for the capacity of communities at a
subnational level to exercise political self-governance.117
This link between state sovereignty and individual liberty reflects a
liberty-based view of federalism that has animated arguments against
the mandate as a violation of our system of limited government,
which is legally distinct from objections grounded in individual
rights-based claims.118
114. Id. at 202 (“This federalist structure supports a general, albeit rebuttable, presumption
that any given policy question should be addressed by state governments.”).
115. See, e.g., Jack Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 40 (2010).
116. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health
Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY, 581, 632–33 (2010)
(explaining why allowing the federal government to use the taxing power to impose the mandate
despite not calling it a tax initially proves that “the individual insurance mandate was designed to
obviate political accountability” that would normally curb government excess).
117. Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should
Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78
IND. L.J. 459, 479–80 (2003).
118. See, e.g., id.; Barnett, supra note 116, at 626–27, 632–33. Barnett goes even further to
propose an “anti-commandeering principle” of federalism that applies to individuals, as well as
states:
As we have seen, the anti-commandeering cases that limit the commerce power of
Congress were ultimately grounded by the Supreme Court in the text of the Tenth
Amendment. Yet the letter of . . . [it] is not limited to states. . . . As Justice Thomas has
written, the Tenth Amendment “avoids taking any position on the division of power
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Even scholars who articulate federalism-based concerns about
health reform acknowledge the potential benefits of federal action
that can be consistent with our system of dual sovereignty.119 There
are two prominent theories proposed to explain when federal action
is desirable according to, and consistent with, federalist principles—
cooperative federalism and collective-action federalism. Cooperative
federalism reflects the idea that the federal and state governments
often view their powers as complementary, working together to solve
problems that may implicate local and national interests.120 This
often occurs through the federal government’s spending power: it
offers states funding to encourage states to work with the federal
government, according to some set of standards or expectations
established through conditions attached to the funding.121 Indeed the
federal government’s longstanding partnership with states in
Medicaid is seen as a prototypical example of this.122 The ACA’s
approach to the health benefit exchanges is another example: federal
funding is offered to states that want to create their own state
exchanges, and federal subsidies are used to encourage and empower
between the state governments and the people of the States” . . . . In this way, . . . [it]
recognizes popular as well as state sovereignty.
Id. at 626–27 (emphasis in original). See also Abigail R. Moncrieff, Cost-Benefit Federalism:
Reconciling Collective Action Federalism and Libertarian Federalism in the Obamacare
Litigation and Beyond, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 288, 289 (2012) (describing federalism-based
objections to reform as reflecting a view that “federalism exists for reasons other than efficiency
of regulation and particularly that the Founders created the federal structure for the protection of
individual liberty,” and referring to this view as “libertarian federalism”).
119. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 113, at 207–12; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A
Critique of the Narrow Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 718
(2002) (agreeing that a contemporary originalist approach is consistent with most, but not all,
modern legislation). Pushaw later argued that even under this broad interpretation the mandate is
unconstitutional. Loyola Hosts Debate on Health Care Mandate, SUMMARY JUDGMENTS:
LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL, LOS ANGELES FACULTY BLOG (Mar. 10, 2011), http://llsblog
.lls.edu/faculty/2011/03/loyola-hosts-debate-on-healthcare-mandate.html. Defenders of reform
acknowledge some limits, but understand these limits to allow a great deal of room for federal
regulation consistent with our constitution. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 115, at 5 (applying a
“contemporary originalist” approach to find a collective-action theory of federalism that explains
the modern regulatory state and supports the constitutionality of the mandate). Others have
argued that the Tenth Amendment should not be understood to limit the federal spending power.
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 89 (2001).
120. See Adler, supra note 113, at 207–12.
121. See Chemerinsky, supra note 119, at 93–96.
122. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2629 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
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individuals to buy health insurance. The ACA’s structure is the
hallmark of cooperative federalism: it combines the benefits of
federal funding with state flexibility and oversight.123
Collective-action federalism views federal action as a legitimate
method to solve problems that may seem local in nature, but which
have broader implications and which states are either unwilling to
solve or incapable of solving on their own.124 Health reform has been
justified under this theory. The funding and blueprint for exchanges
create a platform that can enhance states’ ability and willingness to
solve the growing problem of the uninsured and rising healthcare
costs.125
Some view the question of the mandate’s constitutionality as
reflecting a tension between theories of cooperative and collectiveaction federalism used to justify the mandate on the one hand, and
the liberty-based view of federalism used to attack its
constitutionality on the other.126 However, some scholars criticize the
way each of these theories is applied to the constitutional question in
the first instance.
For example, scholars have argued that a liberty-based theory of
federalism that views federal intervention as inherently threatening to
liberty is an empty theory that does not reflect an appreciation for
what people need to actually realize liberty. Brennan makes this
point in his critique of Barnett’s liberty-based argument against the
mandate:
123. See Abigail R. Moncrieff & Eric Lee, The Positive Case for Centralization in Health
Care Regulation: The Federalism Failures of the ACA, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 266 (2011)
(“[T]he [ACA] entrusts large swaths of its implementation to the states.”).
124. See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory
of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 115–16 (2010) (arguing that Article I § 8 generally
should be understood to authorize Congress’s additional powers to address collective-action
problems and that this theory should inform the Court’s understanding of the division of powers
between the federal government in states, which has lead the authors to propose replacing the
distinction between economic and noneconomic activity with the distinction between collective
and individual choice by states).
125. See Moncrieff, supra note 118, 288–91; Neil S. Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence:
Collective Action Federalism and the Minimum Coverage Provision, 75 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 29, 29–34 (2012); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2611 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (noting that the
mandate is necessary to deal with the collective-action problem of the national economic
implications of the growing number of uninsured who are “free riders” in a system that
guarantees emergency care and where states cannot resolve the problem on their own).
126. Moncrieff, supra note 118, at 289 (citations omitted) (“According to this view, there is
inherent value to state power that ought to be preserved against national encroachments.”).
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Barnett wants us—indeed, wants the Supreme Court—to
begin from a presumption of liberty and, what he takes to be
its correlate, a presumption against regulation. Leaving
aside for the moment the unstated justifications for those
presumptions, however, we should note that a presumption
in favor of liberty does not itself entail an absence of
regulation. For example, some individuals may not be
“free” to be healthy unless they obtain medical care. These
same individuals may not be able to obtain medical care
unless they have health insurance. And they may on
occasion not have health insurance unless regulations
compel them to buy it. The category of “liberty” is not
exhausted by negative liberty, or freedom from interference;
it also includes positive liberty, or freedom to act or be in a
certain way. The freedom to be healthy may be enhanced by
regulation, and this apparently is what Congress thought
when it passed [the ACA].127
Indeed, a number of scholars have argued generally for a more robust
definition of liberty that not only contains negative rights but also
acknowledges the importance of a positive right to basic needs,
including the right to health, which gives meaning to this notion of
liberty.128 Moreover, those knowledgeable about health insurance
markets have offered compelling arguments for why federal reform
is necessary to remove market impediments that prevent individuals
from accessing the healthcare so critical for realizing the promise of
liberty.129
127. Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Individual Mandate, Sovereignty, and the Ends of Good
Government: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1623, 1641 (2011)
(emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
128. For scholars arguing more specifically that the mandate is consistent with, and critical
for, a more robust theory of liberty that includes the right to health, refer to NORM DANIELS, JUST
HEALTH CARE 36–58 (1985); Larry Gostin, Securing Health or Just Health Care, 39 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 7, 9 (1994); Hoffman, supra note 28, at 40–41; Ronald Dworkin, A Bigger Victory Than
We Knew, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/
archives/2012/aug/16/bigger-victory-we-knew/?pagination=false.
129. Some argue that Congress is too restrained and will need to act more boldly and
centralize more functions in order to better achieve goals of insurance market reform. Moncrieff
& Lee, supra note 123, at 266 (“[T]he Act entrusts large swaths of its implementation to the
states. This Article argues, from a purely functional perspective, that the federalist structure in the
ACA is a mistake. Healthcare regulation in the modern age should be national project entrusted
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On the other side of the debate, scholars objecting to greater
federal regulation of healthcare raise concerns about how theories of
cooperative and collective-action federalism work in practice.
Cooperative federalism justifications for federal spending in
healthcare have been dismissed based on assumptions that the federal
government’s use of its funding is inherently coercive and usurps
state authority.130 For example, Loyola challenges the
characterization of Medicaid as the prototypical example of
cooperative federalism, saying that the Medicaid expansion
provisions “show how illusory state ‘prerogative’ really is in the
conditional federal grants context.”131 Adler similarly criticizes the
Medicaid expansion, describing the problem of political “lock-in”
that makes it effectively impossible for states to opt out of Medicaid
altogether.132
Some acknowledge the potential benefit of cooperative federal
action to solve collective-action problems, but they define the
benefits so narrowly, or make flawed assumptions about the
countervailing costs of federal action, that the scope of federal power
they would deem legitimate is severely limited. For example, in
rejecting the collective-action justification for health reform, Adler
acknowledges only limited efficiency gains from certain kinds of
federal action, such as data collection or economies of scale that
could enable firms to offer standardized products throughout the
nation.133 The health and financial benefits expected from health
reform do not meet his criteria for the kind of benefits that would
solely to the central government.”). The Moncrieff and Lee also note that “[p]art of the reason
that lawmakers have chosen ‘cooperative federalism’—or this disjointed mess—is that Congress
is structured to be protective of states’ interests.” Id. at 268.
130. See, e.g., Loyola, supra note 101, at 116–17 (describing the conditional federal grants in
the ACA as an “example[] of ‘cooperative federalism’ [that is] incompatible with ‘the structural
framework of dual sovereignty,’” and stating that “[w]herever federal programs confront states
with a choice between subordinating local preferences to federal ones, on the one hand, and
giving up either revenue or regulatory autonomy on the other, there is coercion”). Yet states’
opposition to establishing health benefit exchanges (and consequently getting federal funds to do
so) undermines this notion of inherent coercion. See, e.g., State Exchange Profiles: Missouri,
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. HEALTH REFORM SOURCE, http://healthreform.kff.org/StateExchange-Profiles/missouri (last visited Sept. 29, 2012) (“[I]n April 2012, the Missouri
legislature rejected a $50 million federal grant to upgrade the state’s Medicaid information
technology system because lawmakers saw it as a possible framework for building an
exchange.”).
131. See Loyola, supra note 101, at 134.
132. See Adler, supra note 113, at 215.
133. Id. at 205–06, 218.

576

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:541

justify federal action.134 Moreover, Adler seems to assume the
inevitability of certain costs of intervention—namely, lack of state
experimentation and political accountability—that he says would not
outweigh any benefit.135 These assumptions animate his criticism of
reform generally, but his criticism of the Medicaid expansion is
particularly revealing.
Adler characterizes the Medicaid expansion as “dramatically
reshap[ing] federal-state relations” and characterizes these reforms as
“increasing pressure on state governments to follow the federal
government’s lead.”136 As evidence of this conclusion, Adler relies
on an article about the Tennessee Medicaid Managed Care program
(“TennCare”) to make a very specific, and uncontroversial, point—
the phenomenon of political “lock-in.”137 Yet, this article’s authors
present a far more nuanced picture of the state’s power than is
reflected in Adler’s critique and that undermines Adler’s conclusion
that federal action impedes state experimentalism and
accountability.138
In the TennCare article, authors Blumstein and Sloan describe
how Tennessee obtained a federal waiver for a Medicaid
demonstration program in 1993 so that it could establish a Medicaid
managed care plan.139 Despite its concerns over Medicaid costs,
Tennessee decided to experiment with managed care as a way to
increase healthcare coverage of Medicaid beneficiaries and non-

134. Id. at 216.
135. See id. at 202, 207.
136. Id. at 199.
137. Id. at 215 (citing to James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Health Care Reform Through
Medicaid Managed Care: Tennessee (TennCare) as a Case Study and a Paradigm, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 125, 141–42 (2000)).
138. I am not claiming that Blumstein and Sloan would say there is no federalism problem
with how the Medicaid expansion is being implemented. In fact, James Blumstein, Professor of
Law at Vanderbilt University School of Law, filed an amicus brief recognizing the flexibility
inherent in much of the traditional Medicaid program, but arguing that the expansion as
structured under the ACA does not leave states with a meaningful choice about whether to
participate in the expansion. Brief of James F. Blumstein as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners (Medicaid Issue) at 20–29, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 132 S.
Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400), 2012 WL 195306, at *20–29. Blumstein does not suggest the
expansion be struck down, however; he argued that treating the expansion as a “new program” to
which states have the choice to opt in would avoid the coercion problem. Id. at *36. This is the
compromise the Supreme Court ultimately struck in the case. See Part V.B.
139. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 137, at 129–32.
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Medicaid-eligible Tennesseans who were either uninsured or
uninsurable.140 The authors describe the results of TennCare’s
experiment:
[Since implementation, it] has increased coverage beyond
its Medicaid core by nearly a half-million people, and has
achieved its access goals while spending less than the
negotiated budget neutrality cap . . . . The 1997 Balanced
Budget Act institutionalized TennCare’s mandated
managed care approach by authorizing states, without
seeking a waiver, to require Medicaid beneficiaries to . . .
receive medical care benefits through managed care entities.
TennCare, therefore, represents a major state-initiated
healthcare reform effort.141
Thus, Tennessee viewed federal funding as leverage for it to
find a creative way to care for more citizens while reducing cost.
Moreover, TennCare’s experiment provided a model for reform that
other states followed, leading to changes in federal law to make such
reforms easier to accomplish.142 The bottom line is that with federal
help, states drove reform; they were not passive recipients of federal
mandates imposed from on high.
Baker and Berman’s critique of federal healthcare regulation
reveals flaws similar to Adler’s. In an article written prior to the
ACA, Baker and Berman attack the cooperative federalism at work
in the Medicaid program. They insist that “judicially enforced
limitations on the spending power increase and preserve diversity
among the states within the realm of what is constitutionally
permitted, thereby ultimately increasing aggregate social welfare.”143

140. Id. at 130.
141. Id. at 131.
142. Id.
143. Baker & Berman, supra note 117, at 470–71 (footnote omitted). To be fair, in the text
where this assumption is developed, authors use some qualifying language:
[S]tate-by-state variation will almost always satisfy more people than would the
imposition of a uniform national policy, and will almost always therefore increase
aggregate social welfare. . . . [S]tate-by-state diversity will generally allow government
to accommodate the preferences of a greater proportion of the electorate, as long as
those preferences are unequally distributed geographically. And . . . this is likely to
mean that the imposition of national uniformity in the absence of consensus will reduce
aggregate social welfare relative to the existence of state-by-state diversity.
Id. at 471 (emphasis added). However, in a footnote, the authors explain this qualification is
necessary because of legitimate differences in how to measure welfare; they do not acknowledge
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And they criticize “advocates of national power [as] often giv[ing]
too little weight to the value of self-governance by state political
communities.”144 Yet these criticisms ignore state flexibility in the
law itself, as well as contrary evidence drawn from the
implementation of Medicaid reforms in practice. In particular, they
do not consider accounts by legal scholars, policy analysts, and
social scientists describing in detail how Medicaid managed care
reforms have provided an opportunity for increased public
participation in shaping health policy at the local level.145 This
opportunity for local participation is due in part to federal laws
requiring consultation of stakeholders, but it is also due to the fact
that these reforms are state driven.
Thus, in challenging cooperative and collective-action based
theories for federal action in healthcare, scholars make, at best,
incomplete and, at worst, inaccurate assumptions about the effects of
federal action on states and individuals. These assumptions are, in
turn, used to support a presumption against regulation and to
reinforce a narrative of reform as a theoretical threat to federalism,
without regard to how reform might further federalism goals in
practice. Finally, some legal scholars have undermined a more
nuanced and thoughtful federalist critique of reform by adopting
oversimplified and sensational descriptions of the Act as a
“dramatic[] reshap[ing] [of] federal–state relations in health care
policy” or as a “health care revolution” that “radically alter[s] the
relationship between individuals and the government.”146
Consequently, federalism-based objections in both the political and
legal arenas have tended to obscure the reality that the ACA,
structurally and functionally, creates a platform that empowers state
experimentation and gives individuals greater choice in the market—

how federal funding has already sparked state diversity and innovation in the Medicaid program,
and how federal law can help ensure public participation and local accountability. Id. at n.64.
144. Baker & Berman, supra note 117, at 479.
145. See, e.g., COLLEEN M. GROGAN & MICHAEL K. GUSMANO, HEALTHY VOICES,
UNHEALTHY SCIENCE: ADVOCACY AND HEALTH POLICY FOR THE POOR (2007) (examining
Connecticut’s Medicaid advisory board process, and providing prescriptive advice for creating a
participatory process in state level health policymaking that meaningfully addresses the health
concerns for the poor and dispossessed).
146. See Adler, supra note 113, at 199–200.
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a reality that undermines the federalism-based justifications for
limiting federal power.147
B. Focus on the Mandate and
the Commerce Clause Debate
The federalism narrative in the mainstream media and in much
legal commentary sharpened around the Commerce Clause challenge
to the individual mandate. This may seem odd because the most
obvious “threat” to states’ rights, or the legal question that most
directly implicated federal-state boundaries, was the Medicaid
challenge. States’ interests were much less clear in the private
insurance reform context, where the challenge centered on the
individual mandate. Nonetheless, Medicaid and the power to tax and
spend were largely absent from the public debate.
1. The Mandate and the Parade of Horribles:
An Easy Target
One reason that the debate focused on the mandate was that it
was an easy political target. It proved to be a compelling rhetorical
example of government forcing its way into our personal decisions,
which played into fears of big government. As already noted,
President Obama had disclaimed it as a candidate and the mandate
was controversial, even among reform supporters. For states, the
individual mandate was thought to be a powerful weapon in attacks
on reform.148 Legally, the mandate was understood to be an
unprecedented exercise of federal power,149 and opponents viewed
this as a compelling invitation for the Court to impose greater limits
on federal power. This hope was understandable in light of the
narrowing of federal power by the Rehnquist Court,150 and
predictions that such narrowing would continue under the Roberts
Court.151 Finally, by their own admission, lawmakers viewed the

147. Id. In fairness, this may be due in part to the newness of the exchanges and the fact that
many details are still to be decided. However, even a cursory review of the number and character
of the decisions that are already clearly delegated to the states challenges these assumptions.
148. See Leonard, supra note 78, at 73.
149. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012).
150. See Baker & Berman, supra note 117, at 460; Chemerinsky, supra note 119, at 89.
151. See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Can They Kill Health Care in Court?, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 22,
2010, 8:37 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/03/23/how-to-kill-health-care-incourt.html.
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mandate as “essential” to the other reforms included in the ACA.152
As a legal matter, this meant that striking down the mandate could
jeopardize the entire Act.
Although the legal question headed to the Supreme Court was
whether the mandate was unconstitutional because Congress
exceeded the scope of its enumerated powers under the Constitution,
the idea that the mandate infringed on liberty resonated more
strongly among reform opponents. Liberty-based theories of
federalism were used to try to persuade people that upholding the
mandate would empower the federal government to try to control
every aspect of our lives.153 The focus on the mandate allowed those
opposed to reform to create an overly simplistic narrative about a
federal takeover of healthcare that threatened individual liberty and
reinforced assumptions that states and others challenging the
mandate were acting as protectors of this liberty. The mandate was
floating out on its own in this narrative—disconnected from the rest
of the private or public reforms that provided the necessary context
for understanding how the ACA could actually further, not threaten,
federalism principles.
2. The Medicaid Expansion:
A More Formidable Federalist Foe
There were many reasons why Medicaid did not get as much
attention as the mandate. First, unlike the mandate, Medicaid has
been around a long time and the expansion did not appear to create a
novel question of law that would generate exciting commentary and
debate. Moreover, even though a significant number of people had
benefited from or held favorable attitudes toward Medicaid, many
were still unaware of some basic facts about it.154 The concept of an

152. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2591–92.
153. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 116; Moncrieff, supra note 118; Stewart, supra note 22.
154. See HENRY J. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL 3, 5
(2011) [hereinafter Kaiser Health Tracking Poll], available at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls
/upload/8190-F.pdf (describing the results of a public poll on the importance of Medicaid where
almost half of the participants said that Medicaid is “very” or “somewhat” important). Although
this poll reflects significant support for Medicaid, it does not necessarily evidence widespread
understanding of the federal–state partnership in Medicaid. For example, out of 1,203 adults
polled, in the part of the Kaiser Health Tracking Poll that asked about block grants, participants
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individual mandate is pretty simple; the massive legislative and
regulatory intricacies that shaped the federal–state interaction in
Medicaid made it much harder to understand, and thus attack. There
also was not as clear a divide between the support and opposition to
the expansion. As noted in Part II, despite the fact that twenty-six
state officials signed on to the challenge, there was widespread
support for the expansion among lawmakers in these and other states.
Unfortunately, its supporters were not always as vocal.155
More significantly, however, challenges to the Medicaid
program did not fit the simplistic narrative that reform threatened
federalism principles. Courts had consistently affirmed the spending
power as a tool of cooperative federalism, consistent with the spirit
of dual sovereignty embodied in the Constitution, and Medicaid in
particular has been the prototypical example. Moreover, state
opposition to a Medicaid expansion that was extremely generously
funded by the federal government, and that would have helped
ensure healthcare access for the very poor who have been excluded
from public and private insurance, did not present a compelling or
sympathetic picture of states. It actually undermined the picture of
states as protectors of individual liberty, or at least highlighted an
empty notion of liberty adopted by many reform challengers.
Finally, states’ concerns regarding Medicaid were far more
nuanced than the objection to the expansion. In fact, their more
immediate concerns related to the effect of the individual mandate on
existing Medicaid eligibles.156 Despite anti-welfare-program rhetoric
that has painted people as expecting government to take care of all of
their needs, the reality is that a number of eligible people have not
enrolled in Medicaid for a variety of reasons—stigma, bureaucracy,
were first given descriptions of the current Medicaid system as well as what the proposed changes
would mean. Id. at 1–2.
155. See, e.g., John E. McDonough, Medicaid’s Moment (Guest Opinion), KAISER HEALTH
NEWS (July 13, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/columns/2011/july/071311mcdonough.
aspx?referrer=search (“[W]hile Democrats are effusive in their praise of Medicare, their silence in
response to public attacks on Medicaid has been deafening—during the fight over health reform
legislation and since.”). Former President Clinton finally mentioned it in his speech at the
Democratic National Convention, but even then he focused more on how it benefits the middle
class and poor children with autism. Bill Clinton, Former U.S. President, Remarks at the
Democratic National Convention (Sept. 5, 2012), (transcript available at http://abcnews.go.com
/Politics/OTUS/transcript-bill-clintons-democratic-conventionspeech/
story?id=17164662).
156. See, e.g., Brietta Clark, State Reactions to Medicaid Reforms, HEALTH CARE JUSTICE
BLOG (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.healthcarejusticeblog.org/2010/03/state_reactions.html.
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lack of information, or a fear of other consequences. 157 If the
mandate leads to increased enrollment of existing eligibles, this will
cost states much more than the newly eligibles because existing
eligibles are subject to the traditional federal matching formula under
the original program.158 To the extent state opposition was driven by
the desire to avoid the costs of covering people to whom states
already had a legal duty, this would have undermined the picture of
states as protecting individuals’ liberty interests.
3. Regulating Commerce Versus
the Power to Tax and Spend
As already noted above, the government’s own framing of the
constitutional basis for the mandate, as well as the apparent
consensus developing among lower courts, sharpened the focus of
federalism-based objections to reform on the scope of federal power

157. See, e.g., Brietta R. Clark, The Immigrant Health Care Narrative and What It Tells Us
About the U.S. Health Care System, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 229, 254–56 (2008) (noting that
immigrants who are eligible for Medicaid may be afraid to seek public health benefits for a
number of reasons, including the fear of jeopardizing their immigration status or exposing
undocumented family members to government officials who could have them deported); Brietta
R. Clark, Using Law to Fight a Silent Epidemic: The Role of Health Literacy in Health Care
Access, Quality, & Cost, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 253, 258–67, 282–83 (2011) (describing the
problem of poor health literacy, which impacts approximately ninety million people in the U.S,
and explaining how it impedes people’s ability to process the kind of information used on
insurance enrollment forms and required to navigate the healthcare system). In their 2010 study,
John Holahan and Irene Headen note that changes in coverage under the ACA will vary
depending on how aggressive the federal government and states are in their outreach and
enrollment campaigns to the public. The study presents an “enhanced scenario,” which reflects
the kind of aggressive outreach that will be needed to promote more robust participation in
Medicaid and to further reduce the number of uninsured in this low-income population, as
compared to the standard scenario. The study predicts that “a new culture of coverage along with
outreach efforts are likely to yield more participation . . . [by] both those made newly eligible for
coverage under health reform and eligible for coverage prior to changes in reform.” HOLAHAN &
HEADEN, supra note 44, at 5.
158. HOLAHAN & HEADEN, supra note 44, at 6 (“Under these higher participation
assumptions, new spending for Medicaid would continue to be mostly federal . . . [but] [t]he share
of spending borne by the federal government will be somewhat lower under the higher
participation assumptions, primarily due to higher take-up among those who are eligible under
pre-PPACA rules. Since the states will receive lower federal matching rates for those previously
eligible, states will be responsible for a higher share of their costs.”); see also Medi-Cal Could
Grow to 10.5M Enrollees by 2019, Report Finds, CALIFORNIAHEALTHLINE (Oct. 27, 2010),
http://www.californiahealthline.org/articles/2010/10/27/medical-could-grow-to-105m-enrolleesby-2019-report-finds.aspx (noting that reform could lead to more than 500,000 currently eligible
residents to enroll in California’s Medicaid program).
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under the Commerce Clause. This made sense given the fact that the
commerce power had been a frequent site for federalism-based
struggles over the proper balance of federal-state power,159 and that
with few exceptions, scholars focused on the mandate as reviving
this debate over the commerce power.160
Legal questions involving the taxing and spending powers were
largely neglected because they were much less controversial. A
consensus seemed to be developing that the mandate could not be
justified under the taxing power, but that the Medicaid expansion
could be easily justified by the spending power.161 The test

159. See Pushaw, Jr., supra note 112, at 888–94 (providing a brief overview of the evolution
of the Commerce Clause doctrine) (“Congress did not begin to invoke the Commerce Clause to
enact large-scale legislation until the late nineteenth century. The Court, seeking to protect
regulatory power over ‘local’ matters, adopted an unduly restrictive definition of ‘commerce’—
buying, selling, and shipping goods—and hence struck down many federal laws dealing with
activities such as manufacturing and labor. The Court initially applied this jurisprudence to
invalidate New Deal legislation, which systematically addressed matters formerly left to the
states, such as agriculture, employment, manufacturing, and banking. This judicial resistance
ended in 1937, when the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act . . . in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.”). Over the next several decades, a narrow majority of the Court embraced a
more expansive view of the Commerce Clause power, which has been used to uphold a vast
expansion of federal power through laws such as the Fair Labor Standards Act applied to a small
lumber company whose employees engaged in local manufacturing, the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which banned racial discrimination in public accommodations, and criminal bans on loan
sharking. Id.; see also Balkin, supra note 115 (using a lens of “contemporary originalism” to
explore how the evolution of Commerce Clause jurisprudence has dovetailed with the rise of the
modern regulatory state); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001) (exploring historical documents to establish that the original meaning
of the Commerce Clause was narrow); Pushaw & Nelson, supra note 119 (arguing that the
language of the Commerce Clause plausibly lends itself to a broader reading and that this reading
is preferable to a narrow one).
160. See Balkin, supra note 115, at 44. A search of law review articles revealed that many
more people had written about the Commerce Clause issue than other issues prior to NFIB; see
also Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
1825, 1827–28 (2011) (noting the sharpening focus on the Commerce Clause in part due to trends
among lower courts). Even among scholars who addressed the commerce and taxing powers, far
more emphasis was placed on the commerce power. However, some scholars did focus on the
taxing argument as a strong justification for the mandate. See, e.g., Akhil Amar, The Lawfulness
of Health-Care Reform, YALE L.J. ONLINE (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1856506 (last visited Nov. 8, 2012); Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to
Destroy: An Effects Theory of the Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195 (2012), available at
http://www.virginialawreview.org/articles.php?article=403; Brian D. Galle, Conditional Taxation
and the Constitutionality of Health Reform, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 27 (2010), available at
http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/889.pdf.
161. See, e.g., Nicole Huberfeld, Post-Reform Medicaid Before the Court: Discordant
Advocacy Reflects Conflicting Attitudes, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 513, 527–33 (2012); Mark Hall,
Individual Versus State Constitutional Rights Under Reform, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1233, 1237–41
(2010/2011); Leonard, supra note 68, at 787–88, 793; Steven D. Schwinn, The Framers’
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governing Congress’s ability to act pursuant to its spending power
was viewed as extremely easy to satisfy, making this a less viable
site for enforcing robust limits on federal power. There seemed to be
a consensus that the spending power was “untouchable” and a
“loophole” that allowed the federal government to circumvent more
robust Tenth Amendment limits on other federal powers.162 Although
the taxing power is also quite broad, very few people thought that the
shared responsibility payment used to enforce the mandate could
plausibly be viewed as a tax subject to this broad federal power.
This seemed to lull most people into an expectation that the
mandate, and not Medicaid, would be the ACA’s Achilles’ heel and
that the commerce power, not the taxing and spending power, would
determine the law’s fate. This also meant that legal debates about the
power to tax and spend, as well as policy discussions about the
consequences of the ultimate holding, were not nearly as well fleshed
out as they could have been. Indeed, many people were caught by
surprise when the Roberts Court upheld the mandate as an exercise
of the taxing power and upheld only a limited version of the
expansion due to an unprecedented finding of coercion.
IV. UPHOLDING THE MANDATE WITH A TWIST:
THE TAXING POWER SAVES THE DAY
Challenges to the ACA centered on whether the individual
mandate and the Medicaid expansion exceeded Congress’s Article I
powers. Federalism concerns about limited federal government, state
Federalism and the Affordable Care Act, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1071, 1096–97 (2012). But see
Loyola, supra note 101.
162. See Baker & Berman, supra note 117, at 460 (“[M]any commentators . . . have proposed
that Congress should respond to the Rehnquist Court’s states’ rights decisions by using the
spending power to circumvent those limitations on congressional power.”); see also Mark
Tushnet, Alarmism Versus Moderation in Responding to the Rehnquist Court, 78 IND. L.J. 47, 52
(2003) (describing the Court’s observance of a loophole in which “Congress could induce state
compliance” using its spending power). But, for a notable exception, see Nicole Huberfeld, Clear
Notice for Conditions on Spending, Unclear Implications for States in Federal Healthcare
Programs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 441 (2008). Huberfeld describes Arlington Central School District
Board of Education v. Murphy, a decision rendered by the first Roberts Court, arguing that it may
become “a benchmark for Spending Clause jurisprudence.” Id. at 441. She suggests that Arlington
“refashioned the foundational clear statement rule to a ‘clear notice’ standard that requires more
specific statutory language from Congress and that is particularly attuned to the state’s
viewpoint.” Id. She predicts that “[t]his analytical shift may narrow Congress’s ability to place
conditions on federal spending.” Id.
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sovereignty, and individual liberty figured prominently in the Court’s
consideration of these questions. At the beginning of the opinion,
Chief Justice Roberts framed the specific constitutional questions as
arising out of a fundamental and perpetual question about the proper
scope of federal power in our system of dual sovereignty, where the
“National Government possesses only limited powers; the States and
the people retain the remainder.”163 Roberts went on to explain the
important interests served by limiting federal power:
“State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: Rather,
federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from
the diffusion of sovereign power.” . . . Because the police
power is controlled by 50 different States instead of one
national sovereign, the facets of governing that touch on
citizens’ daily lives are normally administered by smaller
governments closer to the governed. The Framers thus
ensured that powers which “in the ordinary course of
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the
people” were held by governments more local and more
accountable than a distant federal bureaucracy.164
The government defended the mandate on two grounds—its
power to regulate interstate commerce and its taxing power. In
defining the scope of these powers, Chief Justice Roberts further
cautioned that they “must be read carefully to avoid creating a
general federal authority akin to the police power.”165 In light of the
overwhelming focus on the commerce power prior to NFIB, it makes
sense that the Court began with this issue and that this argument
received the greater amount of attention by the Justices.
A. Why the Mandate Exceeds the Commerce Power:
The Activity–Inactivity Distinction
The Constitution authorizes Congress to “regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the

163. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012). The Court noted
that although the “Federal Government has expanded dramatically over the past two centuries, . . .
it still must show that a constitutional grant of power authorizes each of its actions.” Id. at 2578.
The Court contrasts this with the “general power of governing, possessed by the States but not by
the Federal Government, as the ‘police power.’” Id.
164. Id. (citations omitted).
165. Id. (citations omitted).
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Indian Tribes.”166 The Court has interpreted this to allow Congress to
regulate “‘the channels of interstate commerce,’ ‘persons or things in
interstate commerce,’ and ‘those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce.’”167 This last prong has been understood to give
Congress expansive power to reach activities that may be local or
noneconomic in nature but that in the aggregate have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.168
One case that illustrates the breadth of this power is Wickard v.
Filburn.169 In Wickard, the Court upheld a federal law that limited
the amount of wheat that a local farmer could grow solely for his
own consumption and not for commerce.170 The Court held that
although growing wheat for consumption is a local activity, Congress
could reach it based on the concern that the amount of wheat farmers
grew for their own use would diminish demand and thus have a
substantial effect on the commercial market for wheat.171 In rejecting
the appellee’s claims that the regulation exceeded the scope of the
commerce power because such effects were at most “indirect,” the
Court noted that such questions “are not to be decided by reference
to any formula which would give controlling force to nomenclature
such as ‘production’ and ‘indirect’ and foreclose consideration of the
actual effects of the activity in question upon interstate
commerce.”172
The federal government’s power to regulate interstate commerce
has also been understood broadly because the Constitution authorizes
Congress to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers.”173 Gonzales v. Raich
is an example of this power’s breadth.174 In Raich, the Court upheld
federal legislation enacted to regulate the interstate market in

166. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
167. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2578.
168. Id. at 2578–79.
169. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). The Court has described Wickard as “perhaps
the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity.” United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
170. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 118–19.
171. Id. at 125.
172. Id. at 119–20.
173. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl.18.
174. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005).
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marijuana, but which also prohibited the local possession and
cultivation of marijuana.175 The plaintiffs brought suit seeking an
exemption from the regulation on the basis that the federal
government had no power to regulate marijuana that is locally grown
and consumed.176 The Court denied the exemption based on the
government’s argument that marijuana is a fungible commodity and
thus could be easily diverted into the interstate market. 177 Because
Congress’s attempt to regulate the interstate market would be
undercut without the ability to regulate intrastate possession and
consumption, the law was upheld as a necessary and proper aspect of
the larger regulatory scheme. Indeed, even Justice Scalia in Raich
recognized the breadth of the necessary and proper clause, noting
that it “empowers Congress to enact laws in effectuation of its
[commerce] power[] that are not within its authority to enact in
isolation.”178
In NFIB, the federal government relied heavily on the expansive
substantial effects test from Wickard,179 as well as the vast discretion
given to the federal government through the necessary and proper
clause as understood in Raich, to justify the mandate.180 Despite
acknowledging the breadth of the commerce power, as illustrated by
Wickard and Raich, however, a majority of the Court concluded that
the Commerce Clause was not broad enough to permit Congress to
require individuals to purchase insurance through the individual
mandate.181
175. Id. at 32–33 (2005) (challenging application of the federal Controlled Substances Act to
two California residents who suffered from a variety of medical conditions and grew and
consumed medical marijuana pursuant to the terms of the California’s Compassionate Use Act).
176. See Brief for Respondents at 12, Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (No. 03-1454).
177. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.
178. Id. at 37, 39 (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the “necessary and proper” power as
broader than the “substantial effects” test and describing the relevant question as “simply whether
the means chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the attainment of a legitimate end under the
commerce power”).
179. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2585–86 (citing United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 118–19 (1941), and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942) for the
substantial effects test).
180. Id. at 2593.
181. Chief Justice Roberts, writing only for himself, reached this conclusion in Part III-A of
the opinion. Id. at 2585–93 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito did not join in any part of the Chief Justice’s opinion, but they agreed the mandate exceeded
the scope of Congress’s Commerce Power, largely for the same as Chief Justice Roberts. See id.
at 2644–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). See also, Jonathan D. Varat,
Supreme Court Foreword, October Term 2011: Federalism Points and the Sometime Recognition
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1. The Substantial Effects Test
As part of the ACA, Congress included legislative findings of
the substantial and harmful commercial effects of the growing
numbers of uninsured and the uncompensated care problem.182 Based
on lower court decisions, challengers’ briefs, and the Justices’
opinions, there does not appear to have been any serious dispute
about the substantial effect of uninsurance on interstate commerce.183
Rather, five Justices of the Court found the mandate to be a violation
of the commerce power because of a missing element: activity.184 In
separate opinions, Chief Justice Roberts and the Joint Dissenters
(Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito) concluded that as
broad as the federal government’s commerce power may be it does
not allow the government to compel someone to purchase an
unwanted product. These Justices found evidence for their
interpretation of the commerce power as having a threshold activity
requirement in the constitutional text and precedent.
For example, Chief Justice Roberts noted that the text of the
clause limits the government’s power to regulating commerce, which
“presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be
regulated.”185 He contrasted language used in the Commerce Clause
with the language of other enumerated powers that expressly gave
Congress the power to create, like the power to coin money or raise

of Essential Federal Power, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 411, 417 (2013) (“Probably out of pique that
Chief Justice Roberts was not willing to go nearly as far as they would, the joint dissenters
conspicuously did not join any aspect of his lead opinion and officially withheld any concurrence
in his opinion at all, even though the dissent, in at least some respects, essentially mirrored some
of the Chief Justice’s conclusions and reasoning.”).
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2).
183. See, e.g. id. at 2585–93 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (holding that the mandate exceeds the
commerce power due to lack of “activity” but not disputing the assertion that the failure to obtain
insurance has a substantial effect on interstate commerce); id. at 2609–18 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (providing a more
detailed summary of the evidence of the substantial effect on interstate commerce that justifies
upholding the mandate under the commerce power).
184. Id. at 2586, 2593 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2647–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, &
Alito, JJ., dissenting).
185. Id. at 2586 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 2647–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
& Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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and support armies.186 Moreover, the Chief Justice and the Joint
Dissenters noted that although no prior case explicitly required
activity, precedent has made clear that existing activity was
presumed.187 Finally, all five Justices were particularly concerned
that to hold otherwise would undermine the principle of a limited
federal government inherent in our dual sovereign system:
The Government’s theory would erode those limits,
permitting Congress to reach beyond the natural extent of
its authority, “everywhere extending the sphere of its
activity and drawing all power into its impetuous
vortex” . . . [and] would give Congress the same license to
regulate what we do not do, fundamentally changing the
relation between the citizen and the Federal Government.188
Writing in dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer,
Kagan, and Sotomayor, criticized this reasoning on several grounds.
Justice Ginsburg argued that neither precedent nor the text or history
of the Constitution requires the Commerce Clause to be interpreted
as having an activity requirement.189 Even if there were such a
requirement, she disagreed with the characterization of the failure to
purchase insurance as inactivity. Rather, she agreed with the
government that the inevitability of needing healthcare, coupled with
laws entitling people to certain kinds of healthcare without regard to
their ability to pay, means that no one can opt out of the health
market.190 Indeed, Justice Ginsburg cited numerous statistics
showing that need for healthcare may be unpredictable but not
unavoidable.191 These unique attributes of the healthcare system and

186. Id. at 2586 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“The language of the Constitution reflects the
natural understanding that the power to regulate assumes there is already something to be
regulated.”).
187. Id. at 2587 (“As expansive as our cases construing the scope of the commerce power
have been, they all have one thing in common: They uniformly describe the power as reaching
‘activity.’ It is nearly impossible to avoid the word when quoting them.”); id. at 2647-48 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
188. Id. at 2589 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 2648 (“[I]f every person comes within the
Commerce Clause power of Congress to regulate by the simple reason that he will one day
engage in commerce, the idea of a limited Government power is at an end”).
189. Id. at 2621 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
190. Id. at 2618–20.
191. Id. at 2610–11, 2618.
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the significant cost of healthcare also mean that healthcare delivery
and financing decisions are necessarily linked.192
Thus, Ginsburg argued, an activity–inactivity distinction was
meaningless because everyone is “active in the market for health
care.”193 For this reason, Ginsburg agreed with the government’s
characterization of the failure to get insurance as a decision to “selfinsure” that is properly subject to commercial regulation because it
inevitably results in costly, uncompensated care.194 She rejected the
characterization of the mandate as a government compelled
“purchase of a discrete, unwanted product” and instead viewed it as
Congress “defining the terms on which individuals pay for an
interstate good they consume.”195
2. The Necessary and Proper Clause
In considering the government’s claim that the mandate was an
essential part of a broader regulatory scheme to regulate commerce,
the Chief Justice did not question whether the mandate was in fact a
“necessary” part of the regulatory framework that required insurance
companies to issue insurance and prohibited them from engaging in
individualized risk rating, and the Joint Dissenters devoted only three
lines of their opinion to speculation that the government could have
achieved its regulatory goals through other means.196 Rather, the
192. Ginsburg also relied on this uniqueness argument to counter federalist concerns that the
mandate will lead to a slippery slope of federal mandates. Id. at 2623. But the Chief Justice was
not persuaded, accusing the federal government and the Justice Ginsburg of engaging in word
play designed to circumvent practical limits on federal power. Id. at 2587–90 (opinion of Roberts,
C.J.).
193. Id. at 2618 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part). Ginsburg also criticized this “activity–inactivity” distinction as the kind of
“formalistic nomenclature” rejected in Wickard and a distraction from the real question about the
link between the challenged regulation and effects on commerce. Id. at 2622 (citing Wickard for
the proposition that questions of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause “are not to be
decided by reference to any formula which would give controlling force to nomenclature such as
‘production’ and ‘indirect’ and foreclose consideration of the actual effects of the activity in
question upon interstate commerce” (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942)).
194. Id. at 2622–23.
195. Id. at 2620.
196. See id. at 2592 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (noting that the Court is very deferential to
Congress’s determination about what is “necessary” and has upheld laws that are “‘convenient, or
useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise’”); see also id. at 2612 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (contrasting the
success in Massachusetts with the mass exodus of insurers from states that attempted to guarantee
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Chief Justice and the Joint Dissenters’ focus was on the importance
of an activity requirement as a constitutional limit to federal power
and why the Necessary and Proper Clause could not be used to
circumvent this requirement.197 For example, after explaining how
deferential the Court has been to Congress on the this prong, the
Chief Justice emphasized the “proper” part of this clause as an
important limiting principle on the otherwise expansive reach of this
provision, noting that laws that are not “consist[ent] with the letter
and spirit of the constitution[]’ . . . are not ‘proper [means] for
carrying into Execution’ Congress’s enumerated powers.”198
According to the Chief Justice and the Joint Dissenters, such laws
undermine the structure of government established by the
Constitution and must be declared unconstitutional.
In their opinion, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito
provided a more vivid description of the unchecked federal power
that would result from allowing the government to mandate
insurance:
Congress has impressed into service third parties, healthy
individuals who could be but are not customers of the
relevant industry, to offset the undesirable consequences of
the regulation. . . . If Congress can reach out and command
even those furthest removed from an interstate market to
participate in the market, then the Commerce Clause
becomes a font of unlimited power, or in Hamilton’s words,
“the hideous monster whose devouring jaws . . . spare
neither sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor sacred nor
profane.”199
access to affordable insurance coverage without a mandate). In fact, challengers relied on the
characterization of the mandate as “necessary” to the larger regulatory framework in arguing that
other parts of the reform could not be severed from the mandate and thus would have to fall with
the mandate if found unconstitutional. But see id. at 2644–47 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito,
JJ., dissenting) (questioning the necessity of the mandate and suggesting alternatives).
197. Id. at 2591 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (noting that the necessary and proper clause “does
not license the exercise of any ‘great substantive and independent power[s]’ beyond those
specifically enumerated”); id. at 2649 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting)
(emphasis in original) (explaining that “the Commerce Clause, even when supplemented by the
Necessary and Proper Clause, is not carte blanche for doing whatever will help achieve the ends
Congress seeks by the regulation of commerce”).
198. Id. at 2592 (emphasis and alterations in original) (quoting McCulloch v. State, 17 U.S.
316, 421 (1819) and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 899 (1997)).
199. Id. at 2645 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (citing THE FEDERALIST
NO. 33, at 202 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
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Considering the prominent role that such concerns played in
these Justices’ decision to find the mandate unconstitutional under
the commerce power, it was no doubt a surprise to his conservative
colleagues when Chief Justice Roberts joined Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan to uphold the mandate as a
constitutional exercise of the taxing power.
B. The Mandate as a Constitutional
Exercise of the Taxing Power:
The Tax–Penalty Distinction
The Constitution provides that Congress may “lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”200
This power to tax and spend has been interpreted as extremely
broad—much broader in fact than the commerce power. The
Supreme Court has made clear that this “grant gives the Federal
Government considerable influence even in areas where it cannot
directly regulate,” which means that the “Federal Government may
enact a tax on an activity that it cannot authorize, forbid, or otherwise
control.”201 Thus, the fact that the federal government cannot
mandate people to buy insurance under its commerce power is not
determinative of the federal government’s power to tax those who do
not have insurance in the form of a shared responsibility payment.
This does, however, raise an important question about whether the
challenged payment can be properly characterized as a “tax” that can
be justified under the broad taxing power or must be treated as a
“regulatory penalty” used to enforce a mandate that must be justified
within the narrower commerce power.
This tax–penalty distinction was also implicated by another
claim asserted by the federal government early in the litigation—that
the legal challenge to the mandate was premature under the AntiInjunction Act (“AIA”).202 The AIA provides that “no suit for the
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be
maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
201. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2579 (majority opinion).
202. Id. at 2584.
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the person against whom such tax was assessed.”203 Effectively, this
means that individuals must pay their taxes before they can bring a
suit to challenge them.204 The earliest that a taxpayer who fails to get
insurance will have to pay the shared responsibility payment is 2015;
if the AIA had applied, it would have prevented a challenge to the
mandate until that time.205
By the time litigation reached the Supreme Court, the federal
government had abandoned this AIA claim, likely because it needed
the matter resolved in order to encourage more states to begin reform
implementation in time for the 2013 due date for exchanges to be up
and running. Nonetheless, because this was a threshold issue that
determined whether it was even appropriate for the Court to hear the
substantive challenges, the Court appointed an amicus to argue that
the action was barred by the AIA.206
To better understand the basis for competing characterizations of
the shared responsibility payment as a tax or penalty, it is important
to understand a bit more about the legal and political context in
which this question arises. First, despite the overwhelming focus on
the mandate, the fact is that the ACA actually gives people a choice
between purchasing a qualified health plan and making a shared
responsibility payment.207 Second, for those who are subject to the
mandate and fail to buy insurance, they must make the required
payment to the IRS as part of their tax filing; and like taxes, the
amount due is determined, in part, as a percentage of income. 208 If
one fails to make the payment, it can be withheld by the IRS from a
refund otherwise due to the taxpayer.209

203. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (effective December 21, 2000).
204. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2582 (explaining that the purpose of this
provision is to “protect[] the Government’s ability to collect a consistent stream of revenue, by
barring litigation to enjoin or otherwise obstruct the collection of taxes”).
205. Id. at 2580.
206. The Court appointed Robert A. Long to brief and argue the proposition that the AIA bars
the current challenges to the individual mandate. Id. at 2582 n.2. Plaintiffs and the federal
government argued against this interpretation. Reply Brief for Private Respondents on the AntiInjunction Act at 1–3, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S.Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11398), 2012 WL 605833, at *1–3; see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2583–84 (holding
that the government is correct in contending that the AIA does not bar the suit).
207. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2010).
208. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2593–94 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
209. Id.
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On the other hand, the ACA labels the payment a “penalty” that
is treated like taxes.210 Moreover, the President and lawmakers have
consistently referred to the shared responsibility payment as a
“penalty” that would be used to enforce the mandate to buy
insurance, not as a “tax” on one’s choice to buy insurance.211 Indeed,
the government has made clear that a mandate is essential to the
success of health reform since buying insurance is crucial for solving
the cost shifting and other financial consequences of the uninsured;
the shared responsibility payment is an alternative, but not a
desirable one.212 Finally, no lower court had held that the payment
could be conceived of as a tax for purposes of the constitutional
analysis, and only one had held that it functioned like a tax for
purposes of the AIA bar.213
210. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2583 (majority opinion) (“[The] penalty for not
complying with the mandate ‘shall be assessed and collected in the same manner as an assessable
penalty under subchapter B of chapter 68,’” which, “in turn ‘shall be assessed and collected in the
same manner as taxes.’”); see also 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(g)(1) (2010).
211. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING UNINSURED UNDER THE
PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
(2010),
available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/09-19-12-Indiv_Mandate_Penalty
.pdf; see also Interview by George Stephanopoulos with President Barack Obama (ABC
television broadcast Sept. 20, 2009), available at http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/
2009/09/obama-mandate-is-not-a-tax/ (rejecting characterizations of the mandate as a tax and
repeatedly describing the shared responsibility payment as a means to ensure more people take
responsibility for purchasing health insurance).
212. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2596 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (noting that
the whole point of the shared responsibility payment is to incentivize the purchase of health
insurance).
213. See, e.g., Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 5–10 (D.C. Cir. 2011), abrogated by Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (applying a functional analysis to reject the “tax” label for
purposes of the AIA bar and only considering the constitutionality of the mandate under the
commerce power); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 539–40, 549 (6th Cir. 2011),
abrogated by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (rejecting the “tax” label for purposes of
the AIA bar and noting that there is no reason to consider the taxing power justification for the
mandate because it is a constitutional exercise of the commerce power). In concurring opinions,
Judges Sutton and Graham specifically considered and rejected the taxing power theory as
justification for the mandate. Thomas More Law Ctr., at 550–54, 566. The Fourth Circuit was the
only court to hold that the Anti-Injunction Act, which “[b]y its terms . . . bars suits seeking to
restrain the assessment or collection of a tax,” barred a challenge to the mandate. Liberty Univ.,
Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 401 (4th Cir. 2011), abrogated by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132
S. Ct. 2566; see id. at 397–401 (vacating the judgment of the district court because it lacked
jurisdiction to decide the constitutionality of the act). Consequently the court did not reach the
merits of the constitutional analysis. Despite this holding, however, the court left unanswered the
question of whether the assessment could still be considered a “penalty” for purposes of the
constitutional analysis. Id. at 413 (“Plaintiffs’ remaining contention as to why the AIA does not
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Thus, in order to answer the legal questions before it, the
Supreme Court had to decide whether the payment was a tax or a
penalty, and the Court surprised most people by deciding that it was
both.
1. Why the Anti-Injunction Act Does Not Apply:
The Payment as a Penalty
On the only issue about which all nine Justices could agree, the
Supreme Court held that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the
plaintiffs’ challenge, concluding that the shared responsibility
payment could not be viewed as a tax for purposes of applying the
bar.214 Although this result was not surprising, the Court’s reasoning
did not follow the trend of the lower courts.
The lower courts considering the issue seem to have assumed
that the analysis of whether the payment should be considered a tax
or a penalty would be the same for both the AIA and constitutional
questions.215 While the specific label given to the payment by
Congress was important, the lower courts applied a functional test to
look beyond the label to determine whether the payment actually
bar their challenge to the individual mandate is that it imposes an unconstitutional regulatory
penalty ‘not designed to raise revenue,’ which assertedly violates the Commerce Clause [and] the
Taxing and Spending Clause . . . . The problem with this argument is that a claim that an exaction
is an unconstitutional regulatory penalty does not insulate a challenge to it from the AIA bar.”);
see also id. at 423 (Davis, J., dissenting) (“Before today, nine federal judges had expressly
considered the application of the Anti-Injunction Act, and all nine held it inapplicable to the
Affordable Care Act’s mandates.”).
214. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2584 (majority opinion); id. at 2655–56 2645
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
215. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F.
Supp. 2d 1120, 1130 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (“A fundamental issue overlaps the defendants' challenges
to several of the plaintiffs' claims, and that is whether the individual mandate penalty is a ’tax’
within Congress’s broad taxing power and thus subject to the Anti-Injunction Act, or instead, a
‘penalty’ that must be authorized, if at all, by Congress’s narrower Commerce Clause power.
Because of the importance of this issue, I will analyze it first and at some length.”). The district
court went on to hold that the payment was not a tax for the AIA or for the constitutional analysis.
Id. at 1136–44. A number of courts did not have to address the taxing power issue after finding
that the AIA did not bar the claim because they found the mandate was constitutional under the
commerce power. See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 549. Nonetheless, in concurring
opinions, Judge Sutton and Graham agreed that the challenge was not barred by the AIA, and
would have gone further to hold that the mandate could not be justified as an exercise of the
taxing power. Id. at 550–54, 566. Although the Fourth Circuit in Liberty applied a functional
analysis to the tax-penalty question, it left open the possibility that the payment could be treated
like a tax for the purposes of the AIA but a penalty under the constitutional analysis. Liberty
Univ., 671 F.3d at 413. But not all of the judges agreed. In a concurring opinion, Judge Wynn
insisted that his “conclusion that the mandates are (constitutional) taxes inevitably leads back to
the AIA’s bar to this case.” Id. at 415 (Wynn, J., concurring).
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functioned more like a tax or a penalty, and all but one concluded
that the payment was more accurately considered a penalty than a
tax.216 The amicus appointed to argue the AIA claim before the
Supreme Court similarly relied on a functional test but used it to
argue for the opposite result—that the payment looked more like a
tax, and thus should be subject to the AIA bar.217 The Supreme Court
rejected the functional test used by the courts and the amicus:
Amicus argues that even though Congress did not label
the shared responsibility payment a tax, we should treat it as
such under the Anti-Injunction Act because it functions like
a tax. It is true that Congress cannot change whether an
exaction is a tax or a penalty for constitutional purposes
simply by describing it as one or the other. Congress may
not, for example, expand its power under the Taxing
Clause, or escape the Double Jeopardy Clause’s constraint
on criminal sanctions, by labeling a severe financial
punishment a “tax.”
The Anti-Injunction Act and the Affordable Care Act,
however, are creatures of Congress’s own creation. How
they relate to each other is up to Congress, and the best
evidence of Congress’s intent is the statutory text. We have
thus applied the Anti-Injunction Act to statutorily described
“taxes” even where that label was inaccurate.218
Amicus offered additional arguments that did not rely on this tax
characterization. For example, amicus argued that the AIA had been
applied to other kinds of assessments and that by considering the
216. See, e.g., Liberty Univ., 671 F.3d at 404 (“[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed
that congressional labels have little bearing on whether an exaction qualifies as a ‘tax’ for
statutory purposes. . . . In light of this history, it is not surprising that no federal appellate court,
except the Sixth Circuit in Thomas More, has ever held that the label affixed to an exaction
controls, or is even relevant to, the applicability of the AIA.”); Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d
at 539–40; see also Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1314 (11th
Cir. 2011) (“It is not surprising to us that all of the federal courts, which have otherwise reached
sharply divergent conclusions on the constitutionality of the individual mandate, have spoken on
this issue with clarion uniformity. Beginning with the district court in this case, all have found,
without exception, that the individual mandate operates as a regulatory penalty, not a tax.”).
217. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2583.
218. Id. (citations omitted); accord id. at 2656 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ.,
dissenting) (“What qualifies as a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, unlike what
qualifies as a tax for purposes of the Constitution, is entirely within the control of Congress”).
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Anti-Injunction Act and Affordable Care Act together, Congress’s
intent to make the Anti-Injunction Act applicable to the individual
mandate became clear.219 The Court did not find these arguments
convincing,220 emphasizing the importance of the penalty label as
evidence of Congress’s intent.221 The Court found the AIA
inapplicable.222
2. The Constitutional Analysis:
Reconceptualizing the Payment as a “Tax”
In contrast to the AIA analysis, the Supreme Court did not defer
to Congress’s label for the purpose of determining whether the
payment could be characterized as a “tax” that could be used to
uphold the mandate as a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing
power.223 The Court said that it must look beyond the label and apply
a functional test to determine whether the payment effectively
functioned more like a tax subject to the taxing power or a penalty
subject to the Commerce Clause.224 This time, Chief Justice Roberts,
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, found
that the shared responsibility payment could be characterized as a tax
and upheld the mandate under the taxing power.
219. See id. at 2583.
220. Essentially, amicus argued that by directing that the penalty be “assessed and collected
in the same manner as taxes,’” Congress intended to have the penalty treated as a “tax” for
purposes of the AIA bar as well. Id. at 2583. The federal government contested this interpretation,
arguing that this provision was meant only as a directive to the “Secretary of the Treasury to use
the same ‘methodology and procedures’” for collection of taxes. Id. The Court found the federal
government’s argument more persuasive. Id. at 2583–84. Amicus also pointed to another
provision of the Internal Revenue code—§ 6201(a)—which “authorizes the Secretary to make
‘assessments of all taxes (including interest, additional amounts, additions to the tax, and
assessable penalties).’” Id. at 2584. It argued that this was evidence that penalties should be
treated like taxes, including for purposes of the AIA bar, but the Court rejected this argument as
well. Id. The Court noted that although this interpretation seems reasonable when reading the
statute in isolation, it is clear from a more comprehensive reading of the Internal Revenue Code
as a whole that taxes and penalties are treated as distinct terms and have different legal
consequences in other instances. Id. Thus, the Court found that one provision merely authorizing
the Secretary to assess penalties as part of its tax assessment “does not equate assessable penalties
to taxes for other purposes.” Id.
221. Id. at 2583 (citation omitted).
222. Id. at 2584; id. at 2656 2649 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
223. Id. at 2594 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“It is up to Congress whether to apply the AntiInjunction Act to any particular statute, so it makes sense to be guided by Congress’s choice of
label on that question. That choice does not, however, control whether an exaction is within
Congress’s constitutional power to tax.”).
224. Id. at 2594–95.
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It was clear that this was not an easy decision for the Chief
Justice to make. Writing for himself, Chief Justice Roberts began this
part of the opinion by noting that the government’s taxing-power
argument presented a serious conceptual challenge to the Court:
The Government’s tax power argument asks us to view
the statute differently than we did in considering its
commerce power theory. In making its Commerce Clause
argument, the Government defended the mandate as a
regulation requiring individuals to purchase health
insurance. The Government does not claim that the taxing
power allows Congress to issue such a command. Instead,
the Government asks us to read the mandate not as ordering
individuals to buy insurance, but rather as imposing a tax on
those who do not buy that product.225
The government’s use of terms like “coverage requirement” and
“mandate” makes the law look regulatory in nature and appears to
create a legal obligation to do something—purchase insurance—that
must be authorized by the Commerce Clause. Indeed, this was the
assumption that pervaded the federal government’s rhetoric and
primary legal justification both in the ACA and in its briefs and
arguments before the Court.226 In fact, Chief Justice Roberts almost
immediately conceded that this was “the most straightforward
reading of the mandate.”227 But he also acknowledged that statutes
can have different meanings and said that as long as the
government’s alternative reading of the statute was a reasonable one,

225. Id. at 2593 (citation omitted).
226. See, e.g., id. at 2584–91.
227. Id. at 2573–74. Justice Ginsburg, writing for Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan,
concurred with most of the Chief Justice’s rationale for upholding the mandate under the taxing
power. Id. at 2576. But Justice Ginsburg did not join the part of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion
where he concluded that “the most straightforward reading of the mandate is that it commands
individuals to purchase insurance,” and that because the Commerce Clause does not support the
individual mandate, it is necessary to turn to the taxing power as an alternative justification. Id. In
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence, she wrote separately to make clear that she disagreed with the
Chief Justice and the Joint Dissenters on the commerce issue and that she did not think it was
necessary to even address the commerce issue in light of the fact that a majority agreed that the
coverage requirement, Id. at 2628-29 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment
in part, and dissenting in part). She did not express an opinion about what she considered to be
the most natural reading of the mandate or the apparent inconsistency between the taxing-power
and commerce-power justifications raised by the Joint Dissenters.
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the Court had a “plain duty. . . to adopt [this reading if it] will save
the Act.”228
The Chief Justice then considered the reasonableness of the
government’s tax characterization under the functional analysis. This
time, writing for a majority, he asked whether the shared
responsibility payment looked more like a tax, which could be
upheld under the extremely broad taxing power, or whether it must
be viewed as a regulatory penalty for a mandate, which five Justices
had already decided would violate the commerce power.229 The
Court concluded that the payment could be viewed as functioning
like a tax in many respects:
[I]t is paid into the Treasury by “taxpayer[s]” when they file
their tax returns. It does not apply to individuals who do not
pay federal income taxes because their household income is
less than the filing threshold in the Internal Revenue Code.
For taxpayers who do owe the payment, its amount is
determined by such familiar factors as taxable income,
number of dependents, and joint filing status. [Moreover,]
[t]he requirement to pay is found in the Internal Revenue
Code and enforced by the IRS, which—as we previously
explained—must assess and collect it “in the same manner
as taxes.” [Finally,] [t]his process yields the essential
feature of any tax: it produces at least some revenue for the
Government. Indeed, the payment is expected to raise about
$4 billion per year by 2017.230
Moreover, the Court found that the assessment does not have the
usual indices of a penalty for unlawful conduct. In distinguishing the
ACA payment from the kind of penalty typically subject to the
stricter Commerce Clause test, the Court looked at three things: the
amount due, the absence of a scienter requirement, and the means of
collection.231 First, the Court noted that for most Americans the
amount due will be far less than the price of insurance, which gives
consumers a real choice between making the payment to the
government or buying insurance; thus the payment does not look like
228. Id. at 2593–94 (“The question is not whether that is the most natural interpretation of the
mandate, but only whether it is a ‘fairly possible’ one.”).
229. Id. at 2593.
230. Id. at 2594 (citations omitted).
231. Id. at 2595–96.
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a “‘prohibitory’ financial punishment” that is designed to force
compliance with the mandate.232 This was supported by CBO
estimates that four million people each year will choose to pay the
IRS rather than buy insurance.233
Second, the coverage requirement is solely enforced through
IRS collection of the shared responsibility payment, and the ACA
prohibits the IRS from using its harshest collection tools, such as
liens, levies, and criminal prosecution, which are more consistent
with punitive sanctions.234 Finally, the fact that there is no scienter
requirement, coupled with the government’s affirmation that people
can comply with the law either by purchasing insurance or paying
the tax, suggests that the government is not trying to penalize
wrongful behavior but rather is using a tax to merely encourage
people to purchase insurance.235 The majority highlighted the fact
that people are in compliance with the law if they choose to pay the
tax, which undermines the challengers’ (and dissent’s)
characterization of the failure to purchase insurance as unlawful.
Although the majority acknowledged that the payment is designed to
encourage the purchase of insurance and thus serves a “regulatory
function,” precedent has made clear that many taxes serve a dual
regulatory and revenue raising purpose.236
The Joint Dissenters issued a scathing dissent, criticizing the
majority’s assumption that the payment could be legitimately
conceived of as a penalty and tax at the same time for purposes of
applying two different constitutional standards.237 They accused the
232. Id.
233. Id. at 2597.
234. Id. at 2596; see also 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(g)(2) (2010) (barring criminal prosecutions
and prohibiting the Secretary of Health and Human Services from using notices of lien and
levies).
235. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2595–96.
236. Id. As the Court noted:
‘[E]very tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent it interposes an economic
impediment to the activity taxed as compared with others not taxed.’ That § 5000A
seeks to shape decisions about whether to buy health insurance does not mean that it
cannot be a valid exercise of the taxing power.
Id. at 2596 (citation omitted).
237. Id. at 2650–51 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted). The dissent did admit that the payment can be “both [a tax and penalty] for
statutory purposes since Congress can define ‘tax’ and ‘penalty’ in its enactments any way it
wishes.” Id. at 2651 n.5.
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majority of ignoring precedent that established “a clear line between
a tax and a penalty: ‘[A] tax is an enforced contribution to provide
for the support of government; a penalty . . . is an exaction imposed
by statute as punishment for an unlawful act.’”238 They also argued
that the threshold question of whether the provision is a tax or
penalty should have turned on the Government’s framing, and it was
clear that the Act adopted a framing of “wrongdoing” through its use
of terms like “shall,” “requirement,” and “penalty.”239 Finally, the
dissent pointed to the harms created by the majority’s holding,
saying that the majority was rewriting the statute in a way that allows
Congress to avoid political backlash from raising taxes, while also
shielding it from the constitutional implications of creating a
mandate that violates the commerce power.240
In light of its holding, the Court then had to consider whether
the “tax” violated a constitutional limit on direct taxes. The
Constitution provides that “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall
be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein
before directed to be taken.”241 This requirement means that any
“direct tax” must be apportioned so that each State pays in
proportion to its population.242 The Court explained that this is an
unclear clause with a very narrow application.243 It then briefly
concluded that a tax on not having insurance “does not fall within
any recognized category of direct tax” because it is not a
capitation244 or a tax on the ownership of land or personal
property.245
Chief Justice Roberts concluded this part of the opinion by
considering a more fundamental objection to upholding the mandate
in light of the federalism-based concerns that animated the
Commerce Clause opinions by the Chief Justice and the Joint
238. Id. at 2651 (citing United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S.
213, 224 (1996)).
239. Id. at 2651–52.
240. Id. at 2653–55.
241. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
242. Id. at 2598 (majority opinion).
243. Id. For a more thorough explanation of the history of the Direct Tax Clause and why it is
an “anachronistic doctrine” with “ugly historical roots” that should not be applied to the mandate,
see Amar, supra note 160, at 14–15.
244. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2599 (“Capitations are taxes paid by every
person, ‘without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance.’”).
245. Id.
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Dissenters. First, the Chief Justice explained that the activity
requirement, which five Justices found to be a limit on the commerce
power, has never been relevant to the taxing power: “[I]t is
abundantly clear the Constitution does not guarantee that individuals
may avoid taxation through inactivity.”246 Second, he emphasized the
fact that the taxing power is subject to its own limits, like the Article
I prohibition on direct taxes, although the Court found this
prohibition was not implicated in this case.247 Finally, the Chief
Justice noted that the taxing power should not trigger the same
degree of concern about limiting federal power because “although
the breadth of Congress’s power to tax is greater than its power to
regulate commerce, the taxing power does not give Congress the
same degree of control over individual behavior.”248 The power to
regulate under the commerce power can be enforced with the most
severe criminal sanctions, including huge fines, imprisonment, and
all of the other social and civil losses or harm that can result from
being branded a criminal.249 Paying a tax, while it can be
burdensome, is not punishment; and in this instance, the ACA leaves
individuals with a lawful choice to avoid the tax by getting
insurance.
V. NFIB’S UNPRECEDENTED FINDING OF COERCION:
ALLOWING STATES TO OPT OUT OF THE MEDICAID EXPANSION
While Supreme Court review of the challenge to the mandate
was seen as inevitable, the Court’s decision to grant certiorari on the
challenge to the Medicaid expansion was unexpected. As described
in Part II, Medicaid is a longstanding federal–state cooperative health
program for the poor. Congress enacted the program pursuant to its
spending power and has expressly reserved the right to make changes
to the program,250 which it has done many times in order to expand

246. Id.
247. Id. at 2599–2600.
248. Id. at 2600.
249. Id. This includes the “deprivation of otherwise protected civil rights, such as the right to
bear arms or vote in elections; loss of employment opportunities; social stigma; and severe
disabilities in other controversies, such as custody or immigration disputes.” Id.
250. 42 U.S.C. § 1304 of the Social Security Act provides that “[t]he right to alter, amend, or
repeal any provision of this chapter is hereby reserved to the Congress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006).
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the eligibility criteria. In contrast to the novel and unprecedented
mandate challenge, courts have routinely held that amendments to
the Medicaid program are constitutional under Congress’s spending
power.251 By granting certiorari on this question, the Court signaled
its willingness to consider more robust limits on Congress’s spending
power.
A. The Spending Power
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution gives
Congress the power “to pay the Debts and provide for the . . . general
Welfare of the United States.”252 The Court has interpreted this
power very broadly to allow the federal government to use federal
funds as an incentive to states to adopt a federal regulatory regime.
In other words, the federal government can use spending conditions
to encourage a state to take actions that it could not directly require
them to take.253
The plaintiffs in this case were not challenging the federal
government’s power to attach conditions to Medicaid funding
generally. Rather the plaintiffs were challenging how the government
structured this particular expansion. Pursuant to Congress’s right to
amend Medicaid program conditions, the ACA enacted this
expansion as an amendment to the existing Medicaid program. This
meant that Congress made states’ continuing participation in
Medicaid—and thus the receipt of funding for beneficiaries eligible
under pre-ACA criteria—conditional upon states’ participation in the
expansion.254 This is significant, states argued, because a provision
of the Medicaid Act predating the ACA gives HHS the power to
terminate the funding of states that do not comply with Medicaid
program requirements.255 As a result, states that refuse to participate
in the expansion could lose all Medicaid funding.
It is important to note that terminating all Medicaid funds was
the most extreme option under this provision; the Secretary had the
251. See Leonard, supra note at 68, at 788 n.47.
252. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 1.
253. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2601–02 (citation omitted).
254. Id. at 2601.
255. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(c) (providing that if a state’s Medicaid plan does not comply with the
Act’s requirements, the Secretary of Health and Human Services may declare that “further
payments will not be made to the State”). But see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566
(invalidating application of this provision to states that refuse to participate in the expansion).
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discretion to take less drastic steps, such as terminating payments
only for the categories of service directly affected by the
noncompliance while continuing to allow payments for areas
unaffected by this failure.256 In fact, the federal government has
never terminated all of a state’s funding due to noncompliance, and
there was no evidence that the federal government intended to do so
when the suit was brought.257 State plaintiffs alleged that merely
structuring the expansion this way created a “threat [that] serves no
purpose other than to force unwilling States to sign up for the
dramatic expansion in healthcare coverage effected by the Act” and
thus was coercive in violation of the Tenth Amendment.258
1. The Dole Test Before NFIB
Challenges to the spending power require the courts to balance
the right of the federal government to attach conditions to ensure the
appropriate use of its funds with fears that this power could be used
to usurp state authority. To this end, the Supreme Court in South
Dakota v. Dole259 established a four-prong test for determining the
constitutionality of Spending Clause legislation:
First, the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit
of the general welfare. Second, the conditions on the receipt
of federal funds must be reasonably related to the
legislation’s stated goal. Third, Congress’s intent to
condition funds on a particular action must be unambiguous
and must enable the states to knowingly exercise their
choice whether to participate. Finally, the federal legislation

256. Id.
257. Doing so would only undermine the federal government’s own goals for expanding
coverage for the most vulnerable among us, and it would be a dramatic departure from its typical
flexibility and willingness to issue states waivers. Moreover, the claim was filed minutes after the
legislation was signed so there was no time for such a threat.
258. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2603.
259. 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding the National Minimum Drinking Age Act, which
directed the Secretary of Transportation to withhold 5 percent of the federal highway funds
otherwise payable to a state if that state permitted the purchase of alcoholic beverages by
individuals under twenty-one years of age).
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cannot “induce the States to engage in activities that would
themselves be unconstitutional.”260
This Dole test has long been understood to be very easy to
satisfy. Indeed, the NFIB plaintiffs did not initially challenge any of
these requirements.261 In reviewing the challenge below, both the
Florida district court and the Eleventh Circuit found the test easily
satisfied.262 It was beyond dispute that spending to improve
healthcare for those most in need furthers the general welfare.
Second, conditioning all Medicaid funds on the expansion was seen
as “undeniably related to the purpose of the Medicaid Act, which is
to ‘provid[e] federal financial assistance to States that choose to
reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons.’”263
Third, Congress expressly reserved its right “to alter [or] amend” the
program conditions in the future, which satisfied the “unambiguous
or knowing choice” requirement.264 Finally, there was no claim that
the expansion was otherwise unconstitutional.265
Both the district court and Eleventh Circuit made clear that the
focus of the plaintiffs’ claim was on an additional limit on the use of
the spending power also articulated in Dole—the anticoercion
principle.266 This anticoercion limit was derived in part from the
Tenth Amendment’s reservation of certain powers to the states,
which was understood to prohibit Congress from employing its
260. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1263
(11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted) (citing to South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566.
261. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256,
1266 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (citations omitted) (“Preliminarily, I note that in their complaint the state
plaintiffs appear to have relied solely on a ‘coercion and commandeering’ theory. Nowhere in that
pleading do they allege or intimate that the Act also violates the four ‘general restrictions’ in
Dole, nor did they make the argument in opposition to the defendants’ previous motion to
dismiss. . . . Apparently expanding that argument, the state plaintiffs now argue (very briefly, in
less than one full page) that the Act’s Medicaid provisions violate the four general restrictions.
This belated argument is unpersuasive. . . . [T]he only real issue with respect to Count IV . . . is
whether the Medicaid provisions are impermissibly coercive and effectively commandeer the
states.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566.
262. See id. at 1263–69.
263. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1263 n.63 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 301 (1980)).
264. See id. at 1267.
265. See id. at 1263.
266. Id. The doctrine was first developed in 1937 in Steward and has been affirmed
repeatedly by the Supreme Court. See Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548
(1937).
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spending power “in such a way as to ‘coerce’ the states into
compliance with the federal objective.”267 The clearest application of
this anticoercion principle occurs where legislation explicitly
mandates some action by states or state officials. For example, the
Court has invalidated legislation compelling state law enforcement
officers to perform federally mandated background checks on
handgun purchasers268 and legislation compelling a state to either
take title to nuclear waste or enact particular state waste
regulations.269
The anticoercion principle in the spending context is much more
challenging and amorphous because spending conditions are
structured to preserve state choice. But the Court in Dole said that
“in some circumstances the financial inducement . . . [may be] so
coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into
compulsion.’”270 This idea that the amount of inducement could
become so large as to be coercive has been reaffirmed in other cases,
but prior to NFIB the Court had never invalidated Spending Clause
legislation on this basis.271 Moreover, as the Eleventh Circuit
explained in its decision below, most federal courts have found the
anticoercion principle at best incoherent and at worst completely
unworkable.272 The Court has been criticized for not providing any
guidance for distinguishing coercion from mere temptation or an
offer that is too good to refuse.273 The doctrine itself has been
criticized as creating the perverse result that the more generous the
federal government is with its funding, the greater the chance the
amount could be seen as coercive and the less control the federal
government may have over its own funds.274
267. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1264.
268. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) (opinion of Roberts,
C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.) (citing Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997)).
269. Id. (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174–75 (1992).
270. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (citing Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 590).
271. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
272. See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1265 (“[F]ederal courts have been similarly
reluctant to use it.”).
273. See, e.g., Celestine Richards McConville, Federal Funding Conditions: Bursting
Through the Dole Loophole, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 163 (2001); see Chemerinsky, supra note 119, at
102.
274. See Chemerinsky, supra note 119, at 104.
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2. After NFIB: A New Theory of
Coercion or the Dole Test with Teeth?
For the first time, the Court in NFIB found a federal spending
condition to be coercive. The Court’s decision was surprising not
only because it was unprecedented, but also because it was the only
substantive aspect of the case that did not result in the usual 5–4
divide. Seven Justices, through two separate opinions, agreed that
requiring participation in the expansion as a condition of existing
Medicaid funding was coercive.275 The notion that states must have
had a “genuine” or “real choice” in deciding whether to participate in
the expansion was key to this holding.276
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for himself, Justice Breyer, and
Justice Kagan, began by discussing the tension between the federal
government’s right to direct the use of its funds for the general
welfare and the importance that this power does not undermine
states’ choice about whether or not to participate as partners in
implementing federal policy objectives.277 He compared this kind of
federal–state partnership to a contract, emphasizing the importance
of states “knowingly and voluntarily accept[ing] the terms of the
‘contract.’”278 He also emphasized the importance of “scrutiniz[ing]
Spending Clause legislation [in order] to ensure that Congress is not
using financial inducements to exert a ‘power akin to undue
influence.’”279 The Joint Dissenters mirrored this approach in their
separate opinion.280 In finding the expansion coercive, all seven

275. Justices Breyer and Kegan joined in Chief Justice Robert’s opinion, while Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito reached the same conclusion in their joint dissent. See id. at
2601–09 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); id at 2656–68 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). See also Varat, supra note 181, at 418. (“In fact, on
this point the dissenters, despite withholding their official concurrence, were explicit in noting
that ‘[s]even Members of the Court agree that the Medicaid Expansion, as enacted by Congress, is
unconstitutional.” (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2666–67 (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting)).
276. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2607–08 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by
Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
277. Id. at 2603.
278. Id. at 2602.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 2659-2660 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (describing federal
funding conditions in a federal-state program as contractual in nature and noting that “just as a
contract is voidable if coerced, ‘[t]he legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the
spending power . . . rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the
‘contract’”) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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justices considered both the nature of the threat as well as the amount
of financial inducement at stake.281
a. Nature of the inducement
For Chief Justice Roberts, the nature of the inducement used by
the federal government for the Medicaid expansion was problematic
because when funding conditions “take the form of threats to
terminate other significant independent grants, the conditions are
properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy
changes”282 rather than as mere encouragement. Critical to this
analysis was Chief Justice Roberts’s view of the expansion, not as an
extension of the existing Medicaid program, but rather as a “new
health care program” and thus different one.283 The Chief Justice and
the Joint Dissenters seemed to agree that despite the fact that the
federal government expressly reserved the right to amend the
program, states could not have anticipated this kind of program
change:
The Medicaid expansion . . . accomplishes a shift in kind,
not merely degree. The original program was designed to
cover medical services for four particular categories of the
needy: the disabled, the blind, the elderly, and needy
families with dependent children. Previous amendments to
Medicaid eligibility merely altered and expanded the
boundaries of these categories. Under the [ACA],
Medicaid . . . is no longer a program to care for the
neediest among us, but rather an element of a
comprehensive national plan to provide universal health
insurance coverage.
....
. . . A State could hardly anticipate that Congress’s
reservation of the right to “alter” or “amend” the Medicaid

281. Id. at 2602–07.
282. Id. at 2604 (emphasis added).
283. Id. at 2606 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); id. at 2657 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ. dissenting) (describing the expansion as “dramatic” and referring
to Medicaid eligibility categories that existed prior to the ACA as “the old Medicaid program”).
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program included the power to transform it so
dramatically.284
Chief Justice Roberts did not explain his determination that under the
ACA Medicaid would no longer be a program for the neediest
among us, which is striking in light of the fact that the expansion still
would have targeted the extremely poor who are unlikely to be able
to get insurance through employment or on the individual market.
Rather, he seemed to rely on anachronistic assumptions about who
qualifies as “in need.”285
For Chief Justice Roberts and the Joint Dissenters, the extremely
generous federal funding for the expansion did not undermine states’
coercion argument. In fact, Roberts saw it as further evidence that
the expansion was in fact a new and separate program, which, in
turn, reinforced the coercive nature of the threat. 286 This
characterization of the expansion as a “new” program is important
because it makes the relationship between new and existing program
funds more tenuous and thus makes a threat to withhold one for the
other look like coercion. This characterization also supports states’
claims that they could not have anticipated it as part of the original
Medicaid conditions, further undermining the notion that they had a
real choice to accept this possibility when they joined Medicaid.

284. Id. at 2605–06 (emphasis added); accord id. at 2664 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito,
JJ. dissenting) (noting that “the offer that the ACA makes to the States–go along with a dramatic
expansion of Medicaid or potentially lose all federal Medicaid funding–is quite unlike anything
that we have seen in a prior spending-power case).
285. Such assumptions have been used to explain the original line drawing in public
entitlement programs like Medicaid, but have since been recognized as anathema to sound health
policy. See, e.g, Rosenbaum, supra note 35; STREMIKIS ET AL., supra note 40. One recent article
suggests that the Court’s characterization of the expansion as a new program may be based on its
mistaken belief about prior amendments and their connection to existing funding: “The NFIB
plurality fundamentally misunderstood [Medicaid’s] history, leading it to overemphasize
discontinuities between the existing Medicaid program and the Medicaid expansion.” Nicole
Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging Into Endless Difficulties:
Medicaid and Coercion in the Healthcare Cases 15 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper
No. 12-40, 2012).
286. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer
& Kagan, JJ.) (“Indeed, the manner in which the expansion is structured indicates that while
Congress may have styled the expansion a mere alteration of existing Medicaid, it recognized it
was enlisting the States in a new health care program. Congress created a separate funding
provision to cover the costs of providing services to any person made newly eligible by the
expansion.”).
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b. Amount of the inducement
The second part of the Court’s coercion inquiry focused more
directly on the question of when the amount of financial inducement
becomes coercive. Chief Justice Roberts and the Joint Dissenters
used Dole to distinguish mild encouragement from an inducement
that is so significant that it deprives states of meaningful choice.287 In
Dole the Court rejected a challenge to the National Minimum
Drinking Age Act, which directed the Secretary of Transportation to
withhold 5 percent of the federal highway funds otherwise payable to
a state if that state permitted the purchase of alcoholic beverages by
individuals under twenty-one years of age. The Court held that the
amount could only be considered mild encouragement because the
threat of loss was only 5 percent of highway funds, which constituted
less than half of one percent of South Dakota’s budget at the time.288
By contrast, the NFIB Court found that the threat of losing all
Medicaid funds was so great as to have the effect of being “a gun to
the head” of states that would force them to participate in the
expansion.289 By one estimate, termination of all of a state’s
Medicaid funds could amount to a loss of over 10 percent of the
state’s overall budget.290 Moreover, the state would lose the
extensive and costly administrative investments already made.291
Finally, the Court noted the secondary effects of the funding loss,
such as how it would impact states’ ability to receive funding for
other services that are dependent on Medicaid participation. To the
Court, this threat was enough to deprive states of any real choice in
deciding whether to participate.292
287. Id. at 2604–05 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); id. 2662-2664
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ. dissenting).
288. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1986).
289. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2604; accord id. at 2664 (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas & Alito, JJ. dissenting) (concluding that “the offer of the Medicaid Expansion was one
that Congress understood no State could refuse”).
290. Id. (noting that the federal government has provided $3.3 trillion to states for the existing
Medicaid program).
291. Id.
292. Unlike the majority, Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor viewed the generous federal
funding of the expansion as evidence that states were not being asked to undertake an onerous
burden that the federal government would have to force them to take. Id. at 2632 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). The Court rejected
this argument, viewing the amount of new funding provided as irrelevant to the coercion analysis:
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Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor dissented from the holding,
mainly criticizing the assumptions upon which the Court based its
coercion holding. They disagreed with the characterization of the
program as new and believed that states were on notice about the
possibility of this kind of expansion in light of prior significant
expansions.293 They also criticized the Court’s analysis for affirming
an anticoercion principle that has proved unworkable and failed to
give future litigants and judges meaningful guidance on how to
determine whether a state has a “legitimate choice” to accept or
decline federal funds with conditions attached.294
The Court’s reasoning certainly raises more questions than it
provides answers about how the anticoercion principle limits the
typically broad Dole test. Although the Court purported to apply a
coercion test, its reasoning about the nature of the threat was based
on the Court’s finding that two of the Dole requirements were not
met—the “reasonably related” and “knowing choice” requirements—
that were thought to have been easily satisfied by the lower courts,
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, and even the plaintiffs initially.
B. Severability in a Different Light
The final question the Court had to consider was severability: if
any provision was found unconstitutional, could that provision be
severed from the ACA, leaving the rest of the Act intact, or would
other parts of the Act have to fall as well? As noted in Part II, the
overwhelming assumption by everyone, including the Supreme
Court, was that this question would arise as a result of the mandate
being struck down. Indeed, the severability question on which the
Court granted certiorari was specifically tied to the mandate, and at
oral arguments, very little time was given to this question in the
Medicaid context.

“[T]he size of the new financial burden imposed on a State is irrelevant in analyzing whether the
State has been coerced into accepting that burden. ‘Your money or your life’ is a coercive
proposition, whether you have a single dollar in your pocket or $500.” Id. at 2605 n.12 (opinion
of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); see also id. at 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
& Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“[T]he ACA offer is not an ‘exceedingly generous’ gift that no State in
its right mind would decline. Instead, acceptance of the offer will impose very substantial costs
on participating States.”).
293. Id. at 2635–39 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
294. Id. at 2639–41.
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Despite the 7–2 coercion holding, severability was where the
justices broke down along familiar lines again. Although Justices
Ginsburg and Sotomayor would have found the Medicaid expansion
constitutional, they agreed with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Breyer and Kagan that this kind of constitutional infirmity could be
remedied by simply prohibiting application of the coercive penalty
provision to states that refuse to participate in the expansion, leaving
the expansion in place as an option that states can choose.295 For the
majority, this was a pretty clear-cut issue. The part of the Social
Security Act that established Medicaid conditions and contained the
penalty provision also contained a provision explicitly requiring any
provision of the code held invalid to be severed from the rest of the
provision of that Chapter.296
The more difficult question to answer was “whether Congress
would have wanted the rest of the Act to stand, had it known that
States would have a genuine choice whether to participate in the new
Medicaid expansion.”297 Unlike the Social Security Act, the ACA
did not contain a severability provision. However, the majority relied
on a longstanding judicial presumption in favor of severability in
finding that “Congress would have wanted to preserve the rest of the
Act.”298 Because the unconstitutional penalty provision could be
severed from the part of the Act to which it most directly related—
the Medicaid expansion—it seemed only logical that it could be
severed from the rest of the ACA, whose remaining provisions could
“remain fully operative” and were independent of the Medicaid
expansion.299
295. Id. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) (noting that although they do not agree with the majority that conditioning the
expansion on existing funds is unconstitutional, if it is, the proper remedy is to sever the penalty
provision and leave the rest of the Medicaid expansion, and the entire ACA, intact).
296. Id. at 2607 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.) (“The Chapter of
the United States Code that contains § 1396c includes a severability clause confirming that we
need go no further. That clause specifies that ‘[i]f any provision of this chapter, or the application
thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter, and the
application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.’ [42
U.S.C.] § 1303.”); id. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part).
297. Id.at 2607.
298. Id. at 2608.
299. Id.
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The Joint Dissenters, on the other hand would have struck not
only the Medicaid expansion itself as unconstitutional but the entire
ACA.300 The dissent argued that the federal government relied on the
Medicaid expansion as essential to its attempt at creating a near
universal healthcare plan, which meant that it could not be severed
from the rest of the law.301 The Joint Dissenters highlighted the
gaping holes in coverage that would result from a state’s refusal to
participate as evidence that the federal government viewed them as
essentially linked. They concluded that the “most natural remedy”
would be to invalidate the entire Medicaid expansion, which would
mean that the rest of the law should be invalidated as well.302
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF NFIB
As described in Part III, commentary around the health reform
challenge focused the constitutional question and federalism debate
around the mandate as an exercise of the commerce power. This
narrative suggested a dichotomous choice: Would the conservative
majority take this opportunity to further limit federal power, or could
the liberal wing of the court sway one of the other justices to uphold
the mandate? By upholding the mandate under the taxing power and
making an unprecedented finding of coercion, the Court defied this
simplistic narrative. NFIB generates interesting questions about
constitutional limits on federal power, reform implementation, and
the future of health policy, which will likely be explored by
constitutional and health scholars for years to come. This Part
suggests some possible implications that deserve attention.
A. Broader Constitutional Law Implications
NFIB generated a range of reactions in the immediate aftermath.
Some proponents of reform, especially those focused on the decision
to uphold the mandate and the ACA as a whole, saw the decision as
affirming the legitimate power of the federal government to address a
healthcare crisis of national proportions. Some opponents, on the
other hand, likely viewed NFIB as creating an unlimited, plenary
power by the federal government that betrays our federalist structure

300. Id. at 2667–77 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
301. Id. at 2669–76.
302. Id. at 2667-68.
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and opens the door for further encroachments on state sovereignty
and individual liberty. A closer look at the underlying reasoning for
the mandate and Medicaid holdings, however, suggests that the
implications for the scope of federal power in the future are far less
clear.
1. From Commerce to Tax and Spend:
A Shifting Battleground for Attacks on Federal Power?
The activity–inactivity distinction creates a new express limit on
the commerce power, but the significance of this limit is not clear.
The government insisted that a health insurance mandate would not
open the door to other kinds of mandates because of the uniqueness
of the health insurance market. The inextricability of healthcare
treatment and financing, the fact that laws entitle people to certain
kinds of care regardless of their ability to pay, and the inevitability of
needing healthcare created a unique and compelling problem, and the
mandate was an essential part of solving this problem. The
government relied on this uniqueness to assuage concerns that the
mandate would or could usher in a new unlimited, plenary power for
the federal government that it would use to control people’s lives.
Moreover, there is no indication in the joint dissent that the
activity requirement was intended to roll back earlier interpretations
of the commerce power. Even as they found that the mandate
exceeded the commerce power, both Chief Justice Roberts and the
dissenting justices303 expressly affirmed earlier cases like Wickard
and Raich, defining the power broadly.304
The power to tax and spend was the sleeper issue and will likely
generate the most attention going forward as the Court seemed to
both expand and limit this federal power. In upholding the mandate
and Medicaid expansion, the Court reaffirmed the expansive
regulatory scope of the taxing and spending power. Indeed, these
holdings may confirm fears that the power to tax and spend is a
means of circumventing the more robust Tenth Amendment limits on
303. Only Justice Thomas, in a separate one-paragraph dissent, objected to the substantial
effects test as inconsistent with the original understanding of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 2677
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
304. See, e.g, id. at 2588–91 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2646–47 (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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other federal powers. These fears are likely exacerbated by the fact
that the Court upheld a finding of the mandate as a tax based on
reasoning perceived by many as less than satisfying or persuasive,305
and after concluding that it could not be upheld under the commerce
power—the site of more successful attempts to narrow federal
power. Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts’s reluctant and apologetic tone,
as well as Justice Ginsburg’s neglect of the issue in her concurrence,
suggests that not even a majority of the Court was fully persuaded by
this justification. While a few legal scholars have offered more
persuasive and robust justifications for this holding,306 this probably
does little to assuage those who fear that the trajectory of the Roberts
Court is toward greater deference to Congress and a reticence to
narrow federal power.
On the other hand, the Court seemed to apply a more robust
Tenth Amendment limit on the spending power than it had in the
past. The significance of this cannot be overemphasized; courts and
legal scholars had all but given up on the idea that the anticoercion
principle could be a meaningful limit on the spending power. Even
scholars who argued for greater limits on the spending power
conceded that the coercion doctrine as it existed was unworkable and
thus the least effective way to accomplish this.307 They proposed
alternatives, such as tightening up some of the Dole requirements,
especially the “relatedness” and “unambiguous” or “knowing
choice” requirements.308 And although the Court in NFIB purported
to apply the “coercion” doctrine in limiting the Medicaid expansion,
the Court in fact seemed to take these scholars up on their invitation
to revisit the Dole test. NFIB’s coercion finding relied not simply on
the amount of inducement—the factor presumed to determine
coercion in prior Court dicta; it was also based on the conclusion that
the federal government failed to satisfy the second and third Dole
requirements, which had always been easily satisfied for Medicaid

305. See Dworkin, supra note 128.
306. See id.; see also supra note 160 (citing legal scholarship that argued that the taxing
power provided a better justification for the mandate prior to NFIB).
307. See, e.g., Baker & Berman, supra note 117, at 517–21; Loyola, supra note 101, at 135–
42.
308. See e.g., Baker & Berman supra note 117, at 511–12.
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amendments in the past.309 Scholars will likely be debating the
contours of the spending power after NFIB for some time to come:
does the Court’s reasoning reflect a new theory of coercion, an
application of the Dole test with teeth, or both?
2. Chief Justice Roberts’s Legacy and the
Role of Judicial Restraint
Commentary leading up to NFIB implicitly and explicitly
assumed the Supreme Court had immense power to determine the
fate of health reform. It painted a picture of the Court as
ideologically driven, and the media stoked predictions that Justices
would decide the fate of healthcare reform based on their ideological
positions rather than legal precedent.310 Some feared—and others
hoped—that the five conservative Justices on the Court would use
this opportunity to push a Republican agenda:311
The Supreme Court may be headed for its most dramatic
intervention in American politics—and most flagrant abuse
of its power—since Bush v. Gore.
The constitutional objections are silly. However, because
constitutional law is abstract and technical and because
almost no one reads Supreme Court opinions, the
conservative majority on the Court may feel emboldened to
309. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2601–06 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by
Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). For a more comprehensive consideration of the Medicaid coercion holding
and its implications, refer to Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 285.
310. See, e.g., Michael Tomasky, My Supreme Court-Health Care Prediction, DAILY BEAST
(June 27, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/06/27/my-supreme-court-healthcare-prediction.html (“This is easy. I take the darkest and most cynical possible view of the
conservative majority; I believe . . . that they are politicians in robes (with the partial exception of
Kennedy); as such, I believe they will behave here like politicians and they will render the
decision that will inflict the maximum possible political damage on Obama and the Democrats.”).
But not everyone was so cynical. See Meghan Kiesel, Obamacare Predictions: What Will the
Supreme Court Decide? ABCNEWS (June 27, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/
politics/2012/06/obamacare-predictions-what-will-the-supreme-court-decide/ (listing predictions
from a variety of sources, many predicting that the mandate would be upheld, with some
predicting a 6–3 decision).
311. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Faces Weighty Cases and a New Dynamic, N.Y.
TIMES Sept. 30, 2012, at A1; Akhil Amar, How to Defend Obamacare, SLATE (Mar. 29, 2012,
4:07
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/03/supreme
_court_and_obamacare_what_donald_verrilli_should_have_said_to_the_court_s_conservative_ju
stices_.html (explaining how the government’s counsel should have handled the conservative
Justices); Winkler, supra note 151.
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adopt these silly objections in order to crush the most
important progressive legislation in decades.312
These kinds of predictions caused some conservative opponents
who were shocked by NFIB to blame Chief Justice Roberts for
betraying conservative hopes,313 and it led to widespread speculation
about his motives.314 This speculation was likely exacerbated by a
scholarly debate that made it look like the commerce power test
could come out either way, leaving the result apparently up for
grabs.315
Neglected in the commentary and dominant narrative was the
concept of the Supreme Court as a federal actor that should show
significant restraint when considering the constitutionality of
legislation enacted by a democratically accountable body. This
concept was not completely missing, however. In one speech,
President Obama implored the Court to uphold the law not by
making substantive legal arguments about its constitutionality, but by
resorting to notions of judicial restraint.316 An even more pointed
312. Koppelman, supra note 17, at 1–2.
313. See, e.g., Katy Waldman, The Eight Stages of Conservative Greif, SLATE (June 28, 2012,
6:31 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2012/06/republican_response
_to_obamacare_decision_the_eight_stages_of_conservative_grief.html (quoting a tweet by
Georgia Rep. Jack Kingston that read “With #Obamacare ruling, I feel like I just lost two great
friends: America and Justice Roberts”); Elspeth Reeve, Time Is on His Side: Conservatives Feel
Betrayed by John Roberts, ATLANTIC WIRE (June 28, 2012), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/
politics/2012/06/time-his-side-conservatives-feel-betrayed-john-roberts/54023/; Erick Erickson,
The Supreme Court Forces Us to Deal Within the Political System, RED STATE BLOG (June 28,
2012), http://www.redstate.com/erick/2012/06/28/the-supreme-court-forces-us-to-deal-within-the
-political-system/ (“John Roberts’ opinion seems to clearly suggest he wants to keep the Supreme
Court out of political fights and was willing to destroy his reputation with conservatives to do
it.”).
314. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 311 (describing the coming term for the Supreme Court):
“The term will also provide signals about the repercussions of Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.’s
surprise decision in June to join the court’s four more liberal members and supply the decisive
fifth vote in the landmark decision to uphold President Obama’s health care law. Every decision
of the new term will be scrutinized for signs of whether Chief Justice Roberts, who had been a
reliable member of the court’s conservative wing, has moved toward the ideological center of the
court.” Liptak also says that the term “could clarify whether the health care ruling will come to be
seen as the case that helped Chief Justice Roberts protect the authority of his court against
charges of partisanship . . . .” Id.
315. See Pushaw, supra note 112, at 882 (noting that justices are particularly vulnerable to
such claims in cases involving the commerce power and criticizing the current test as so
“malleable” and “vague” that it “can be applied, whether intentionally or not, to promote a
particular ideological agenda”).
316. Obama Takes Aim at Supreme Court, Calls Them “Unelected Group of People”, FOX
NATION (Apr. 2, 2012), http://nation.foxnews.com/president-obama/2012/04/02/obama-slams
-activist-supreme-court-calls-them-unelected-group-people. Obama states, “Ultimately, I'm
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admonition to the Court came from legal scholar Akhil Amar, in an
editorial on Slate.com.317 Styled as an open letter to the Supreme
Court, Amar’s editorial highlighted the troubling consequences for
the Court’s own legitimacy if it were to strike down the mandate:
Nothing in the Constitution or history or structure—or
precedents, for that matter—provides suitable support for
the “mandates are different” intuition, which cannot survive
analytic scrutiny. Such an opinion will not write—or if it
does, it will not last.
....
Meaning, with the greatest of respect for an institution
and individuals whom I hold dear, I have to teach the stuff
that Your Honors write year in and year out to my students.
And if a judicial opinion simply fails tests of text, history,
structure, and logic—and if it comes down by a 5–4 vote;
and if the vote seems to track the party-alignment of
appointing presidents; and if the four dissenters are
emphatic that the majority’s arguments simply don’t wash;
and if the vast majority of us who study constitutional law
professionally, including most conservative scholars, agree
that these arguments simply don’t wash; and if I already
have to do a lot of work to explain Bush v. Gore, in
context—well, what will I tell my students when they say to
me, cynically, that “it’s all politics”? What will I say, when
they ask me (as I have already been asked by one former
student): “Just how many presidential elections are five
conservative justices allowed to undo?”318
While I will refrain from speculating about the Chief Justice’s
motives or whether he was swayed by Professor Amar’s letter,319 I
confident that the Supreme Court will not take what would be an unprecedented extraordinary
step of overturning a law that was passed by a strong majority of a democratically elected
congress. And I would like to remind conservative commentators that for years what we have
heard is that the biggest problem is judicial activism and that an unelected group of people would
somehow overturn a duly constituted and passed law.” Id.
317. Amar, supra note 311. Amar developed these arguments more fully in a later essay. See
Amar, supra note 160.
318. Amar, supra note 311.
319. For speculation about which, if any, legal scholars influenced Chief Justice Roberts’s
decision to uphold the mandate under the taxing power, refer to Randy Barnett, The
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do think it is fair to say that Chief Justice Roberts was clearly
mindful of limits on the Court’s own power and expressly relied
upon judicial restraint at key junctures in the decision. The first was
in his framing of the case at the very beginning:
In this case we must again determine whether the
Constitution grants Congress powers it now asserts, but
which many States and individuals believe it does not
possess. Resolving this controversy requires us to examine
both the limits of the Government’s power, and our own
limited role in policing those boundaries.320
This principle was critical to the Court’s decision to uphold the
mandate, preserve the Medicaid expansion as an option, and save the
rest of the law. Indeed, the joint dissent, which would have held the
mandate and Medicaid expansion unconstitutional and invalidated
the entire Act, is noteworthy for its apparent apathy toward the
principle of judicial restraint. When considering the opinion in its
entirety, it becomes clear that Chief Justice Roberts’s positions on
the underlying substantive questions seem to align more with the
conservative justices, and that their divide on the ultimate holdings
seems driven by different perspectives on how much restraint the
Court should show in light of federalism principles.
B. ACA Implementation and
the Future of Health Policy
NFIB could have a significant impact on reform implementation
and the future of health policy. Upholding the ACA paves the way
for implementation, which will likely change the rhetoric around
health reform and increase public support by allowing people to see
how reform empowers states and individuals to make meaningful
choices. On the other hand, the coercion holding could have serious
negative consequences. In the short term, it will undermine
implementation of the Medicaid expansion in those states that opt
Unprecedented Uniqueness of Chief Justice Roberts’ Opinion, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 5,
2012, 5:14 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/05/the-unprecedented-uniqueness-of-chiefjustice-roberts-opinion/; Robert Cooter & Neil Siegel, Online ACA Symposium: A Theory of the
Tax Power that Justifies—and May Have Informed—the Chief Justice’s Analysis, SCOTUSBLOG
(July 9, 2012, 12:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/online-aca-symposium-a
-theory-of-the-tax-power-that-justifies-and-may-have-informed-the-chief-justices-analysis-2/.
320. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
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out. Over the long term, it could potentially serve as a barrier to the
federal government’s ability to use program amendments to adapt
longstanding federal-state programs, like Medicaid, to changing
health realities.
1. Moving Beyond Rhetorical Federalism321
Opponents of reform claimed the mantle of “protectors of
federalism” in the legal debates on the mandate, while casting those
who embraced reform as “nationalists” who look to the federal
government to solve every problem and who devalue local
governance.322 In this narrative, federal power is viewed as an
inherent threat to states and individual liberty. By saving health
reform, however, NFIB preserves the opportunity for people to
understand how the ACA furthers state sovereignty and individual
liberty. We can now move beyond vague assertions of threats to state
sovereignty and individual liberty, and the benefits of cooperative
and collective-action federalism can come to fruition.
The rollout of the health benefit exchanges, in particular, creates
an opportunity for states and communities to help shape reform
going forward. As described earlier, the ACA continues the trend of
vast state discretion and flexibility and requires stakeholder input as
part of that process.323 Different states vary in the approaches they
are taking to a wide range of implementation decisions that have
been delegated to them: plan design, selection and regulation; the
exchange’s role and regulatory philosophy; stakeholder participation;
information dissemination and marketing; and consumer assistance
321. Some have defended states’ use of this kind of federalist rhetoric. See, e.g., Leonard,
supra note 78 (“While it is easy to dismiss state resistance to ACA as nothing more than Tea
Party politics, my counter view suggests several possible values deriving from the anti-health
reform movement.”). Leonard defines “rhetorical federalism” as the “highly public and vocal
invocation of states-rights arguments to frame objections to comprehensive, sea-changing federal
policies.” Id. at 73. She says, “[t]he theory finds normative value in state-based resistance to
sweeping federal initiatives although not all strategies employed are condoned.” Id. My critique
in this section is focused more specifically on what Balkin has described as the use of federalism
theory as a “rhetorical excuse” for nonregulation. See Balkin, supra note 115, at 40.
322. See supra Part III.
323. To track the various approaches that states are taking toward health reform
implementation, see State Exchange Profiles, Health Reform Source, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., http://healthreform.kff.org/State-Exchange-Profiles-Page.aspx (last visited Mar. 7,
2013).
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programs. These decisions serve as models for the federal
government as it designs the federal exchange.324 In this way, the
ACA explicitly values, encourages, and depends on the kind of state
experimentation and local decision-making that opponents claim is
threatened by federal action.
This is not a prediction that reform will work—that is, that it
will solve our healthcare problem by making insurance affordable
and increasing access through coverage. Rather, I am making a more
limited claim that the ACA creates a “platform of uniform standards
on which both states and private parties can innovate,”325 standards
which at least provide an opportunity to increase consumer choice in
the healthcare market. If the market reforms are successful, then
people will likely come to appreciate how the ACA enhances their
freedom to get health insurance, and thus the healthcare they need to
fully realize their liberty. If reform does not work—that is, if market
reforms do not ultimately guarantee affordable coverage—then
people will have no legal obligation to either buy insurance or make
the shared responsibility payment, and liberty concerns will not be
implicated.
The ACA in action will challenge reform opponents to heed
Balkin’s admonition to “take the language of experimentation
seriously rather than as a rhetorical excuse for nonregulation, or as a
way to resist the application of federal constitutional rights.”326 The
merits of reform will continue to be up for debate among people who
disagree on how much or how little regulation is needed to actually
fix the problem.327 Nonetheless, rhetorical claims about a federal
324. See, e.g., WEINBERG & HAASE, supra note 64, at 1 (describing the flexibility in the
federal health reform law, and noting that because of California’s “front-runner status and the
sheer size of its coverage expansion, California’s choices will have implications for other states as
they address difficult issues, including minimizing adverse selection, promoting cost-conscious
consumer choice, and seamlessly coordinating with public programs”).
325. Balkin, supra note 115, at 40.
326. Id.
327. Even in California, the first state to enact legislation and one of the leaders in developing
an exchange, there continues to be disagreement about the best approach to take. One example is
over how much power regulators should have to deny proposed premium increases found to be
unreasonable. See Sandy Kleffman, Health Insurance Rate Regulation Measure Qualifies for
California’s November 2014 Ballot, MERCURYNEWS.COM (Aug. 24, 2012), http://
www.mercurynews.com/health/ci_21385649/health-insurance-rate-regulation-measure-qualifiescalifornias-november. There are also important conversations about how choices in health reform
implementation will impact access for certain vulnerable populations, like people living with
HIV/AIDS, who have relied heavily on essential community providers. See, e.g., CROWLEY &
KATES, supra note 55; WALTER A. ZELMAN, COMMUNITY-BASED NONPROFIT MEDICAID PLANS
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takeover that suppresses state power and individual liberty cannot
withstand the reality of implementation.328
In fact, if the Court had followed the approach championed by
the Joint Dissenters in the name of federalism, the result would have
had the perverse, immediate, and long-term consequences of
undermining states’ rights and individual liberty.329 Rather than
giving states greater choice, which was the result of the majority’s
compromise, the Joint Dissenters would have deprived states of any
choice to take advantage of the federal funding offered for public or
private expansion. They ignored the fact that for both the public and
private expansions, the ACA empowered states to do things they
wanted to do but otherwise could not because of a lack of
resources.330 Finally, they downplayed the role of consumer choice
NEW HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES (2010),
available at www.statecoverage.org/files/SCI-ZelmanMedicaidExchanges.pdf; Marian Mulkey,
Should California Establish a Basic Health Program for Certain Low-Income Residents?,
GrantWatch Blog, HEALTHAFFAIRS (May 10, 2012), available at http://healthaffairs.org/blog
/2012/05/10/should-california-establish-a-basic-health-program-for-Certain-low-income-residents
/?cat=grantwatch. Similar concerns arise about the success of the new small employer exchanges.
See, e.g., Timothy S. Jost, Employers and the Exchanges Under the Small Business Health
Options Program: Examining the Potential and the Pitfalls, 31 HEALTH AFF. 267 (Feb. 2012),
available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/In-the-Literature/2012/Feb/SmallBusiness-Health-Options-Program.aspx.
328. Interestingly, some of the latest attacks by Republican opponents of reform further
undermine their own claims of a federal takeover. See, e.g., Sara Hansard, Upton, Grassley Call
for More HHS Oversight of How States Using Exchange Grant Funds, BLOOMBERGBNA
HEALTH CARE DAILY REP. (Oct. 1, 2012).
329. The Joint Dissenters, and opponents of reform, wrongly assume that the only alternative
is no federal action. But as Ginsburg pointed out, the dissent’s legal reasoning would limit the
federal government’s ability to experiment primarily through market-based reform, but not its
ability to act on its own. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2612–13 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
Justice Ginsburg argued that the ACA’s approach was consistent with federalism and far more
protective of individual liberty and state governments than the alternative:
Aware that a national solution was required, Congress could have taken over the
health-insurance market by establishing a tax-and-spend federal program like Social
Security. Such a program, commonly referred to as a single-payer system . . . would
have left little, if any, room for private enterprise or the States. Instead of going this
route, Congress enacted the ACA, a solution that retains a robust role for private
insurers and state governments.
Id.
330. Id. at 2667–68 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). To date, the federal
government has provided generous grants to the states totaling over $1 billion. Health Insurance
Exchange Establishment Grants, 2012, STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, http://statehealthfacts.kff.org/
comparetable.jsp?ind=954&cat=17 (last visited Sept. 29, 2012).
AND THE

Winter 2013]

SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM

623

in determining whether to buy insurance and devalued the fact that
the ACA removes market impediments to healthcare so critical for
realizing the promise of liberty.331
2. Adaptability of Federal Healthcare Programs
One aspect of the Court’s decision has particularly significant
implications for the future of health policy: the characterization of
the Medicaid expansion as a “new” and “different” program, on
which the Court’s coercion finding turned. This characterization
creates tremendous uncertainty about the federal government’s
ability to adapt its healthcare programs to evolving knowledge and
market realities. As noted earlier, Medicaid was enacted in 1965, and
though it initially defined eligibility categories narrowly, its mission
was defined more broadly. States have been the drivers of many
changes in the Medicaid program as their own needs change, and the
flexibility inherent in Medicaid’s administrative structure allows the
federal government to be responsive to states’ needs. Medicaid’s
evolution reflects an ongoing state–federal conversation about how
to cover the greatest number of those in need in a cost-efficient and
effective way. Program amendments are part of this conversation; the
federal government uses them to encourage or discourage practices
based on the results of state experimentation and to provide greater
federal support for expanding local need.
The characterization of the expansion as “new” creates the
possibility that future program changes will be deemed by courts to
be too radical or different to be enforced as a program amendment.
The Court failed, however, to give any guidance for determining
when changes qualify as dramatic enough to be deemed “new.” For
example, Chief Justice Roberts could not cite to any text in the
Medicaid Act that limited its mission to only the original Medicaid
categories. Rather, he simply assumed that extending coverage to all
adults under 133 percent of the federal poverty level would mean
that Medicaid is no longer a program to help the neediest among us,

331. Scholars familiar with how healthcare markets work tend to argue that the ACA does not
go far enough and that greater federal action is necessary to fix market impediments. See, e.g.,
Moncrieff & Lee, supra note 123 (arguing that Congress is too federalist in nature and defers too
much to the states).
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an assumption which defies reality.332 Longstanding programs, like
Medicaid, will be particularly vulnerable to this uncertainty in light
of the magnitude of the change likely to occur over a long period of
time and the significant amount of funding upon which states
inevitably come to rely.333
3. Uncertainty Created by
NFIB’s “Opt In” Compromise
The Court’s Medicaid holding has created a more immediate
and practical concern about access for poor, childless adults in states
that choose not to participate in the expansion.334 The ACA provides
that adults with an income up to 133 percent of the federal poverty
level will be eligible for Medicaid as of 2014, but Medicaid will not
be an option for these individuals in the opt-out states.335 The ACA
only provides for federal subsidies to help individuals with an
income between 100–400 percent of the federal poverty level.336 In
opt-out states, this means that people below the federal poverty line
will be left without any federal subsidy to purchase insurance in the
private market and without the Medicaid alternative—making it
virtually certain that they will remain uninsured and dependent on

332. See supra Part II.A (describing the groups most likely to be uninsured and in need of
help prior to the ACA); see also STREMIKIS ET AL., supra note 40 (defining “vulnerable
populations” as including “people with low incomes, the uninsured, and minorities”). The view of
a broader population as “in need” is shared by states that have implemented various programs
prior to the ACA to address the most serious consequences of gaps in the healthcare market. For
example, states have provide targeted help to groups with certain chronic conditions—like breast
or prostate cancer, or HIV—offering free or low cost diagnostic care, treatment, and education on
prevention. Other programs, such as high risk pools, have a broader scope, but have strict
eligibility requirements and are limited in terms of the numbers of people they can take.
333. For a more thorough exploration of the implications of the Medicaid coercion holding,
see Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 285; Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging
Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2128977.
334. See GENEVIEVE M. KENNEY ET AL., URBAN INST., HEALTH POLICY CTR , MAKING THE
MEDICAID EXPANSION AN ACA OPTION: HOW MANY LOW-INCOME AMERICANS COULD
REMAIN UNINSURED, 1 (2012), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412606Making-the-Medicaid-Expansion-an-ACA-Option.pdf. But see Ralph Lindeman, Most States
Likely to Expand Coverage Due to Financial Incentives, Speakers Say, BLOOMBERGBNA
HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT (Oct. 15, 2012).
335. GUIDE TO THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION, supra note 41, at 8.
336. See id.
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the inconsistent and ever-dwindling patchwork of public hospitals
and clinics.
This picture gets even more complicated for the subset of newly
eligibles who would otherwise be eligible for federal subsidies for
use on the federal exchange. Residents in states that do not opt in to
Medicaid expansion are also unlikely to have a state exchange.
Recall that states can refuse to establish their own exchanges and
thus not participate in the private insurance reforms (“private opt
out”). The federal government will establish a federal exchange, with
the expectation that residents in these private opt-out states can use
their federal subsidies to purchase insurance on this federal
exchange. However, at least some reform opponents are now
questioning whether these subsidies can be used on federal
exchanges, arguing that the ACA authorizes them only for statebased exchanges.337 Such challenges hurt already vulnerable citizens
by restricting their choice in the new private and public expansions,
which have already been found constitutional by the Supreme Court.
It is difficult to see how these kinds of attacks serve opponents’
purported liberty goals.
On the other hand, state opposition to the Medicaid expansion
may prove to be more political rhetoric than a firm policy position
that can withstand the reality of the market and its residents’ needs.
When Medicaid and Medicare were first enacted, government
encountered the same kinds of accusations of a federal threat to
337. See Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, Taxation Without Representation: The
Illegal IRS Rule to Expand Tax Credits Under the PPACA, 23 HEALTH MATRIX: J. LAWMEDICINE 119 (2013) (arguing that the ACA does not permit the use of tax credits and subsidies
in federal exchanges created in states without exchanges of their own). But see Timothy Jost, Tax
Credits in Federally Facilitated Exchanges Are Consistent with the Affordable Care Act’s
Language and History, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (July 18, 2012), http://healthaffairs.org/
blog/2012/07/18/tax-credits-in-federally-facilitated-exchanges-are-consistent-with-the-affordablecare-acts-language-and-history/ (arguing that the legislative history and assumptions by the
Congressional Budget Office evidence Congress’s intent that premium subsidies to be available
in all exchanges). There has been litigation and congressional action around this issue. See Ralph
Lindeman, House Oversight Chair Seeks Documents in Federal Exchange-Tax Subsidy Probe,
BLOOMBERGBNA HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT (Aug. 29, 2012) (noting that Republican
Representative Darrell Issa, chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform
Committee, sought information from the IRS in order to challenge the IRS rule that permits tax
subsidies for people purchasing insurance on federal exchanges); Amended Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3–5, 11–21, Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Sebelius, No. CIV-11030-RAW (E.D. Okla. 2012) (arguing that the IRS rule permitting use of subsidies on federal
exchanges expands employer obligations in violation of the ACA and undermines the state’s
authority to regulate health policy as permitted by the ACA).
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states’ rights and individual freedom. Yet today every state
participates in Medicaid, and Medicare has become an entitlement
that seniors and providers fight to keep. Only time will tell.
VII. CONCLUSION
By upholding the ACA, NFIB has paved the way for reform, but
it has not completely foreclosed political and other legal attacks on
reform. On the political side, Republican lawmakers will continue to
try to impede funding and implementation efforts, though such
attempts have been largely unsuccessful so far.338 On the legal side,
rights-based challenges have been filed claiming that certain aspects
of reform are being implemented in an unconstitutional way;
however, these claims do not jeopardize the entire law.339 The ones
receiving the greatest attention are those challenging HHS
regulations requiring prescription contraception coverage as part of
preventive care.340 But other aspects of the law, such as the provision

338. See, e.g., Erick Erickson, The Supreme Court Forces Us to Deal Within the Political
System, RED STATE BLOG (June 28, 2012, 10:47 AM), http://www.redstate.com/erick/2012/06/
28/the-supreme-court-forces-us-to-deal-within-the-political-system/.
339. One challenge seems designed to try to take a second bite out of the apple by challenging
the constitutionality of the mandate, and thus the ACA itself. This latest challenge arises out of
the NFIB’s characterization of the shared responsibility payment as a tax. The claim is that if it is
a tax, then it is subject to the constitutional provision that requires taxes to originate in the House
of Representatives, which opponents argue did not happen. See Pete Kasperowicz, GOP
Resolution: Healthcare Law Violates Constitution for Not Originating in the House, HILL’S
FLOOR ACTION BLOG (July 20, 2012, 8:07 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/
239127-gop-resolution-healthcare-law-violates-constitution-for-not-originating-in-the-house.
This claim seems based on a quibble about the way in which the House version of the bill
evolved, and thus it is unlikely to be viewed as plausible basis for attack.
340. A number of suits have been brought challenging the HHS’s rule requiring employers to
provide preventive services, including prescription contraception for women. See, e.g., O’Brien v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 4:12-CV-476-CEJ, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140097
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2012) (dismissing plaintiffs’ statutory and constitutional claims of
infringement on religious liberty and violation of the Administrative Procedure Act); Newland v.
Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-1123-JLK, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104835 (D. Colo. July 27, 2012)
(granting plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction based on allegations that the mandate
violated the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act); Wheaton College v. Sebelius, No. 1:12CV-01169-ESH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120187 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2012) (dismissing plaintiff’s
motion for a preliminary injunction because the application of the preventive services regulation
remains hypothetical and thus the plaintiff cannot demonstrate an injury-in-fact and does not have
a ripe claim). The Wheaton College case also notes that as of August 24, 2012, twenty-six
lawsuits had been brought challenging the preventive services regulations with regard to
contraception requirement. Id. at *3.
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creating an independent payment advisory commission,341 the use of
federal subsidies in federal exchanges,342 and the Medicaid
maintenance of effort provisions in the ACA,343 have either been
challenged or will likely be challenged soon.
A thorough consideration of these challenges is beyond the
scope of this Article, but they signal a rocky landscape ahead.
Although they will likely keep lawyers and commentators busy for
some time to come, they will not undermine reform implementation,
which is already underway. NFIB has ushered in an exciting new
period of reform in which federal officials, states, insurers, providers,
advocates, and, most importantly, consumers are working together to
try to solve the problem of rising healthcare costs by improving
healthcare access. As a result of this process, and as more of the
benefits of health reform become available and are understood,344
there will likely be less support, or even tolerance, for continued
attacks on reform.

341. See Coons v. Geithner, No. CV-10-1714-PHX-GMS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124196 (D.
Ariz. Aug. 31, 2012) (stayed pending the outcome of NFIB); Second Amended Civil Rights
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5–34, Coons v. Geithner, No. CV-10-1714PHX-GMS (D. Ariz. Aug. 31, 2012), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124196.
342. See supra note 337.
343. The ACA’s maintenance-of-effort (MOE) requirement prohibits states from cutting
eligibility standards for certain Medicaid beneficiaries or imposing stricter standards until 2014.
Commentators are now speculating about whether these provisions could be vulnerable to the
same coercion argument used in NFIB. See Ralph Lindeman, Medicaid ACA Opponents Eyeing
New Challenge To Law’s Maintenance-of-Effort Requirement, BLOOMBERGBNA, HEALTH CARE
DAILY REPORT (Aug. 31, 2012); see also Second Amended Civil Rights Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 341, at 5–34 (challenging the MOE provisions).
344. See, e.g., News Release: Through the Affordable Care Act, Americans with Medicare
Will Save $5,000 through 2022, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Sept. 21, 2012),
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/09/20120921a.html; Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, The
Health Care Law is Saving Americans Money, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Sept. 11, 2012),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/09/11/health-care-law-saving-americans-money (touting
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’s 2012 Annual Rate Review Report). The
report notes that the rate review program, which requires plans to spend at least 80 percent of
premiums on healthcare and demonstrate compliance with the law, has already gone into effect
and saved Americans about $1 billion on their health insurance premiums. See also S.R. Collins,
R. Robertson, T. Garber & M.M. Doty, Young, Uninsured and in Debt: Why Young Adults Lack
Health Insurance and How the Affordable Care Act Is Helping, COMMONWEALTH FUND,
(June 2012), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Issue-Briefs/2012/Jun/YoungAdults-2012.aspx (noting that 6.6 million young adults stayed on their parents plans between
November 2010 and November 2011, who would not have been able to prior to the ACA).
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